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FOREWORD

For a time so long "that the memory of man runneth not to the
contrary" it hath been a custom to print a foreword upon the launching
of every new publication, legal as well as literary. We are but rendering
obedience to this time-honored custom, defined by Blackstone as law,
when we present this foreword upon the launching of our good legal
ship, which we hereby christen the Notre Dame Law Reporter.
In view of the existing law school publications, reviews and journals of the leading law schools of the country, all of which are similar in
character, scope and purpose, it might be supposed that our publication
is to be patterned upon these. But such is not the fact. These law reviews and journals, in their number, excellence and thoroughness, already completely supply the need and demand for such publications.
The Reporter would be merely supplying cumulative evidence of this
class of legal publications, and the court will not grant us a trial for
this purpose. Some minor features of the generally adopted form of
law school publication will be incorporated, but in its important major
part the Notre Dame Law Reporter will constitute a new and novel
departure in law school journalism. We trust, however, that it may not
be subject to demurrer on account of such departure.
The Reporter, which is to be published quarterly during the scholastic year, will be primarily a student publication-of and for and by
the law student body. Its second feature, however, will be no less important than the first-that devoted to the interests of the law alumni.
The purpose of these two departments in the Reporter is to bring together in fact as they are already united in spirit the law school alumni
and the law school students-to bring into active co-operation the law
school triumphant and the law school militant.
The student department will consist of four sections. The court
section will contain the decisions of the Supreme Court of Notre Dame
based on records, assignments of error, and briefs filed therein. Selected
briefs also will be published. The complete record of the Notre Dame
Circuit Court will appear-the pleadings, issues tendered, trial pro-

cedure, verdict, motions, judgment and record for appeal. There will
also be reported the proceedings of the Junior Moot Court and Criminal
Practice Court.
Under the title "Only Our Own Opinion" will appear the special
law papers and legal comments of the editorial staff of the Reporter.
The "Case and Comment" section will present a synopsis of the recent
decisions of the appellate courts and terse briefs on the mort important
and practical propositions of the law.
Law School News will have one division relating to the Law School
itself,-its faculty, courses, courts, library, projects and bulletins; and
another pertaining to the law students themselves,-their activities,
social and personal.
The department of the Reporter devoted to the Alumni of the Law
School will have three features: a Contributing Sections in which will
be published the specially prepared legal briefs and law treatises contributed by the law graduates of Notre Dame; a News Section for reporting the activities of the law Alumni, professional and personal; and
an Alumni Directory calculated to bring all Notre Dame lawyers into
business and professional relations for their mutual benefit.
We are not unmindful of the character and importance of our project, which must be weighed and found worthy or wanting as the representative of the School of Law of the University. We do not, however,
shrink from the responsibility, nor will we shirk the continuing task
that the launching of the Reporter entails. We are conscious of the
infirmities that our first issue of necessity must display, but we ask
kindly consideration for our lofty purpose, and seek refuge from just
criticism in the time-worn but once delectable reminder that everything
improves with age.
With an abiding faith in the earnest co-operation of the students of
the College of Law of today and tomorrow and the proud and loyal
alumni of the old school, we begin ,the career of the Notre Dame Law
Reporter by fondly dedicating it to those same Students and Alumni.
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF.
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SUPREME

COURT

HUNTER v. ELAM

(No. 1)
Sale-Contract to Sell-Potential Existence-Conditions-Sale of AMare for Breeding-Construction of Contract-Interrogatories-Instructions.
1. A contract by which S agrees to the
service of his mare by a stallion of H's
selection and, if a colt is foaled, to keep,
care for and make it fit for H's purpose in
driving the road, when H is to get the colt
and settle with S, is a contract for the sale
of a thing not having a potential existence
and, therefore, is not a present sale, but
like the sale of future goods constitutes
only a contract to sell, which does not pass
title in the colt.
2. Answers by the jury to interrogatories submitted to the effect that S refused an offer of $200 for a colt to be foaled
from his mare, but did accept the proposition that H should pay the service fee for
the subsequent breeding of S's mare and,
as part of the consideration, should pay S
$40 whether a colt was foaled or not, the
terms of the contract being in all other
respects as stated above, do not change the
subjejct matter from the sale of the colt to
the sale of the services of S's mare, so as to
vest title to the colt in H on account of his
special Property in S's mare.
3. Where S while in possession of the
colt under the terms of his contract with
T1, sells and delivers the colt to the defendant, it is not error to instruct the jury
that if the defendant Purchases the colt in
zood faith, for a valuation consideration
and without notice of H's existing contract
with S or his claim to the colt, defendant
would acquire title free from H's claim
under his contract with S. H's only remedy
in such case is an action for damages
against S for breach of contract.
4. Legal effect must be given to entire
contract and not merely to a part.

Action in replevin by William Hunter against John Elam.
From a
judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Md. Edward Doran and Edward C.
McMahon for appellant.
Humphrey L. Leslie and Jerome P.
Martin for appellee.
VURPILLAT, J. Appellant bro-

ught action against the appellee in
the Notre Dame Circuit Court to secure possession of a certain colt. The
case was submitted for trial upon the
complaint and answer in general denial. A jury trial resulted in a gene-
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ral verdict for the defendant. The
jury also returned answers to interrogatories.
Appellant filed a motion for judgment on the answers to the interrogatories, ron obstante veredicto, which
was overruled. A motion for a new
trial was also overruled, and judgment on the general verdict was rendered from which this appeal is
prosecuted.
The errors assigned for the reversal of the judgment are the overruling of the motion for judgment on the
answers to the interrogatories notwithstanding the general verdict,
overruling the motion for a new trial
and that the verdict is contrary to the
law and evidence.
The plaintiff and the defendant entered into separate agreements with
one 'Perry Smith, by the terms of
which each, under his respective
agreement, claims to be the owner
and entitled to the possession of the
colt described in complaint. It is undisputed that at the time of the contract between Smith and the appellee,
Elam, Smith was in actual possession of the colt and represented to
Elam that he owned the colt and
would sell it. Elam thereupon made
an offer to Smith of two hundred dollars for the purchase of the colt
which Smith unconditionally accepted, thereby effecting a valid contract
of sale. This contract, so formed,
was immediately executed by the parties by the performance of the concurrent conditions of sale, Elam, the
appellee, paying to Smith the two
hundred dollars and Smith delivering
to Elam the colt.
These facts operate in law to constitute a sale, or what is sometimes
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called "an executed contract of sale,"
which transfers to the vendee or purchaser the title to the thing sold. 2
Bl. Comm. 446; 2 Kent. Comm. (13th
Ed.) 468; Benj. on Sales (7th Am.
Ed.) I; Sales Act, I. It is also undisputed that the appellee was an innocent purchaser for value and without
notice of appellant's right or claim to
the colt.
It is contended by the appellant.
however, that Smith did not own the
colt at the time of its sale and delivery to the appellee, Elam. That
Smith had in fact sold and conveyed
his ownership of the colt to appellant
by a prior contract of sale with him.
If the seller does not own the thing
sold then he cannot convey title to it,
for it is a familiar principle of law
and equity that one cannot convey a
better title than he himself has. Tiffany on Sales 27; Anson on Contracts
292. And it can make no difference
in such case that the buyer is an innocent purchaser. Sales Act, Sec. 23;
Andrews v. Cox 42 Ark. 473-48 Am.
Rep. 68; Bates v. Smith 83 Mich. 34747 N. W. 249; Kitchell v. Vanader 1
Blackf. (Ind.) 356. If Smith had no
title then appellee could acquire none
by his purchase.
But in this case the burden is upon
appellant to establish his own ownership and right of possession of the
colt at the time of bringing his action,
and he must recover, if at all, upon
the strength of his own title and not
upon the weakness of that of the appellee. Davis v. Warfield et al 38
Ind. 461; Ferguson v. Day, Sheriff 6
Ind. App. 138. This appeal, therefore, must be determined upon the
validity and legal effect of appellant's
contract with Perry Smith. What
terms and conditions the parties
agreed upon are matters of fact for

the jury to determine from the evidence. But the construction of the
contract, its legal effect and the
rights and obligations of the parties
thereunder are all matters of law for
the court to determine. Anson on
Contracts 314; 24 Am. & Eng. Encyc.
of Law page 1047.
The following instruction to the
jury given by the trial court of its
own motion is important at this point
on both the law and the facts of the
case. We give the instruction in full,
being Court's Instruction No. 8:
"The court instructs you that a thing
having no actual or potential existence at the time of the formation of a
contract of sale cannot be the subject
matter of such sale. If you should
find that the plaintiff, William Hunter, and Perry Smith entered into an
agreement and that the terms of such
agreement were that Smith was to
subjeted his certain mare to be bred
to a certain stallion of Hunter's selection; that Hunter was to pay the
service fee; that, if a colt should be
foaled from such service it should be
kept, cared for and made fit for plaintiff's use, that of a physician for driving the road, when the plaintiff
should call for the colt, and, upon
settlement with Smith under their
contract, take the colt; and if you
further find that plaintiff's claim of
ownership and right of possession to
said colt is based solely upon such a
contract so found by you from the
evidence, then, the court instructs
you, such colt had neither an actual
nor a potential existence at the time
of the said contract, and no ownership or right of possession to the colt
in question vested in the plaintiff by
such contract; and this is so in legal
effect even if you find that part of the
consideration agreed by Hunter to bc
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paid to Smith and actually paid was
for the use of Smith's mare whether
the colt was foaled or not."
We consider this a correct statement of the law. Tiffany on Sales 45;
Benj. on Sales (4th Ed.) Sec. 182,
note; 24 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law
1042; Bates vs. Smith 83 Mich. 34747 N. W. 249; Battle Creek Valley
Bank v. First Natl. Bank 62 Neb.
825-88 N. W. 145; Schoobert v. DeMotte (Cal.) 44 Pac. 487; Townsend
Brick Co. v. Allen 62 Kan. 311-62
Pac. 1008-56 L. R. A. 124; Purcell's
Admr. v. Mather 35 Ala. 570-76 Am.
Dec. 307; Low v. Pew 108 Mass. 24711 Am. Rep. 357; Rochester Distilling Co. (N. Y.) 37 N. E. 632; 9 Bush
(Ky.) 318-15 Am. Rep. 711. Speaking of potential existence the Supreme Court of Michigan says: "Potential existence means merely that a
thing may be at some time; actual
existence that it now is. In the legal
sense things are said to hhve a potential existence when. they are the
natural product or expected increase
of something already belonging to the
vendor. When one possesses a thing
from which a certain product, in the
very nature of things, may be expected, such product, we think, has a
potential existence." Dickey v. Waldo 97 Mich. 255-56 N. W. 608; Tiffany on Sales 44.
The jury by answers to interrogatories found specially the facts that
Smith refused an offer of appellant
of $200 for a colt to be bred from
Smith's mare, and then accepted $40
for the service of the mare. Appellant contends that these facts entitle
him to a judgment for the colt, notwithstanding the general verdict;
that these facts establish the subject
matter of the contract to be the ser-

vices of the mare and therefore to
pass title in the colt to him.
In support of this contention appellant cites the case of McCarthy v.
Blevins 5 Yerg. (Tenn.) 195-26 Am.
Dec. 262. Although the opinion of
the court in this case does contain a
dictum to the effect that the sile of
the services of a more for breeding
purposes conveys title to the colt
foaled, this dictum was unnecessary
to the decision of the case, and the
decision itself is generally regarded
as sustaining the rule that a thing
not having a potential existence cannot be the subject-matter of a sale.
The Supreme Court of California, in
Schoobert v. DeMotte, supra, holding
that the mortgagee of sheep is not
entitled to a lien on their increase, be.
gotten after the execution of the
mortgage, has this to say of the Mc.
Carthy v. Blevins case: "The rule
(that the owner of the dam is the
owner of the offspring) has also been
stated in many other cases in whicb
the question was neither involved nor
decided," citing, among others, McCarthy v. Blevins, supra. The decision in McCarthy v. Blevins is that a
cold sold during the period of gestation passes title to the purchaser because the colt has a potential existence at the time of the sale. Tiffany
so regards the case, for he cites it
thus: "McCarthy v. Blevins 26 Am.
Dec. 262 (during gestation)". Tiffany on Sales 48. The same construc.
tion is given the decision by the Supreme Court of Maine in the following language: "It is well settled that
the owner of personal property having a potential existence may sell it.
(Authorities cited). And within this
principle, the owner of a mare may,
during gestation, sell her future offspring, which will vest in the vendee
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when parturition takes place. McCarthy v. Blevins, 5 Yerg. 195."
Sawyer v. Gerrish, (Me.) 35 Am.
Rep. 323.
In the case of animals the commonlaw maxim partus sequitur ventram
applies, and generally the owner of
the dam is the owner of the offspring, before birth and after. 2 B!
Comm. 390; 1 Parsons on Contracts
523; 2 Cyc. of Law & Procd. 309.
Thus the owner of a dam in foal may
sell the colt and reserve the mare, or
sell the dam and reserve the colt.
Andrews v. Cox. 42 Ark. 473-48 Am.
Rep. 473.
That one may sell the services of
his mare for breeding purposes and
thereby convey title to the colt is correct as an abstract proposition of law.
Maise v. Bowman, 19 S. W. 589; Hull
v. Hull, 40 Am. Rep. 165. In.such a
sale the subject-matter is not the colt
but the special property in the mare,
and the purchaser, because he is the
owner of the dam during the time of
the contract of sale, is the owner of
the offspring.
The defect in appellant's contention is that the facts found specially
by the jury are not the only facts in
the case and do not furnish all the
elements of appellant's contract with
Smith. It is quite reasonable to infer from thie jury's general verdict.
which includes all the facts, the existence of the other facts and elements of contract stated in the trial
court's instruction, No. 8, supra. Indeed the trial court seems to have had
in mind the very facts found specially by the jury, for the jury are instructed that if they find the elements
of the contract as stated in the instruction, the appellant would have
no title or right of possession to the
colt,. even if the jury find that part

of the consideration to be paid by appellant to Smith, and actually paid,
was for the use of Smith's mare
whether the colt was foaled or not.
To sustain appellant's motion for
judgment on the answers to the interrogatories, only those which serve
his purpose, and give no consideration or legal effect to the other facts
and elements of the contract as found
by the jury's general verdict would
be to violate the first rule of the construction of contracts, namely: "An
agreement ought to receive that construction which will best effectuate
the intention of the parties to be collected from the whole of the agreement." Anson on Contracts 330. The
contract between the appellant and
Smith must be construed as a whole.
The terms and conditions as to the
breeding and foaling of the colt from
Smith's mare and also the conditions
that Smith was to keep, care for, and
make the colt fit for appellant's use,
and that appellant was to call for it
and settle with Smith, all relate to
the same subject-matter, were agreed
upon at the same time and as part of
one transaction and must be construed as forming but one contract.
17 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law 4; German F. Ins. Co. v. Roost, 55 Ohio St.
581-60 Am. St. Rep. 711; Field v.
Leiter, 118 Ill. 17-6 N. E. 877; Berridge v. Glassey, 112 Pa. St. 442-56
Am. Rep. 322.
The facts found specially by the
jury are in complete accord with their
general verdict. Construed with the
general verdict, as they must be, both
establish a contract by which Smith
agreed to the service of his mare by
a stallion of appellant's selection and,
if a colt should be foaled, to keep,
care for and make it fit for appellant's
purpose in driving the road, when
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appellant is to get the colt and settle appellant to get the colt and settle
with Smith; the appellant, however, with Smith. Tiffany on Sales 126;
obligating himself to pay the servic4 Beni. on Sales 263, Sec. 318; Strous
fee and, as part consideration, to pay v. Ross, 25 Ind. 300; Restad v. EnSmith $40 for the service of the mare gemoen, 65 Minn. 148-67 N. W. 1146.
whether a colt is foaled or not.
In the case of Rourke v. Bullens, 8
There was, therefore, no error in Gray (Mass.) 549, plaintiff purchasoverruling appellant's motion for ed a hog of defendant and left it with
judgment on the answers to the in- defendant upon an agreement that deterrogatories. It is only where such fendant should fatten it until plain.
answers are so inconsistent with the tiff called for it when he would settle
general verdict that they cannot be for it according to the market price;
harmonized, and the facts specially it was held that the contract was
found operate under the law to en- purely executory and did not pass
title the party in whose favor they property to the plaintiff. See Benj.
are returned, to the judgment, that on Sales, page 301, Sec. 349. Marble
such a motion may be sustained. See v. Moore, 102 Mass. 443; Restad v.
the Civil Codes of all the States. Engemoen, supra.
Thornton's Ann. Civil Code, Vol. I,
In support of his motion for a new
pg. 959; Work's Practice & PL., Vol. I, trial, appellant complains of courtrs
pg. 560; Woolen's Trial Procd., Vol. instruction number eleven, given to
2, pg. 985. Every reasonable pre- the jury .by the court of its own mosumption must be indulged in favor tion. The instruction is as follows:
of the general verdict. 22 Am. & If you find from the evidence that deEng. Encyc. of Pld. & Prs. 959, citing fendant, Elam, and said Smith concases from many states.
tracted for the sale of the colt in
One may contract to sell the off- question; that Elam was an innocent
spring of his animals, though they purchaser of said colt, paying therehave neither actual nor potential ex- for to said Smith the sum of two
istence. Hull v. Hull, 48 Conn. 250- hundred dollars; that said Smith was
40 Am. Rep. 165. This, however, then and there in the open, notorious
does not constitute a sale but merely and exclusive possession of the colt,
a contract to sell, and, though it be claiming ownership, and so reprein the form of a present sale, it con- senting himself to Elam at the time;
veys no present title to the purchaser, that Elam inquired of said Smith as
Tiffany on Sales 47. Furthermore, to his ownership of the colt and the
even if appellant's contract were for sale thereof; and you further find that
a colt having a potential existence, it Elam, the defendant, at the time of
must be construed as a mere execu- purchase of the colt and payment
tory contract of sale-contract to sell therefor had no notice whatever of
-not passing title, for the reason any executory contract between Hunthat there are conditions to be per- ter and Smith for said colt, or of any
formed; there was something to be claim by Hunter of any right or in.
done to put the article sold in a de- terest in said colt; and you further
liverable state. Smith was to keep find from the evidence that defendthe colt, raise it and make it fit for ant, Elam, had no knowledge whatappellant's use, and not till then was ever that should put a reasonably pru-
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dent man upon inquiry, then, I instruct you, the defendant, Elam, became the owner of the colt in suit, regardless of any rights and obligations
existing under said contract between
plaintiff and Smith relative to the
colt, and your verdict should be for
the defendant." This instruction cor
rectly states the elements necessary
to constitute one a bona fide purchaser. Pomeroy's Equity, Sec. 745;
Eaton's Equity, pg. 158. The instruction also correctly applies the doctrine of bona fide purchaser to thr
facts of the case. It tells the jury
that if the appellee, Elam, contracted
with Smith for the sale of the colt and
paid the purchase price therefor (a
contract of sale transferring title)
and was a bona fide purchaser as defined in the instruction, having "no
notice whatever of any executory con
tract between Hunter and Smith for
said colt" (a mere contract to sell.
not passing title to Hunter but leaving title in Smith), then, as between
Hunter and appellee, Elam, appellee
would take title free from the claims
of appellant Hunter under his contract with Smith.
Furthermore, this instruction must
be construed with the other instructions of the court in the case. The
court, in the two preceding instruc
tions, defined for the jury, executed
and executory contracts of sale, an'
instructed them that if they found
that Smith had actually or constructively transferred title in the colt to
appellant, before appellee's contract
of purchase with Smith, then they
should find for appellant; but, if they
found that iitle to the colt was not
intended to be transferred to appel
lant, and that his contract with
Smith was only a contract to sell,
then Smith retained title to the colt

with power to sell and convey to an
innocent purchaser.
Appellant's attack upon instruction
eleven, supra, is based on the erroneous assumption, that it instructs the
jury that title may be founded upon
the doctrine of innocent purchaser,
without any regard to the law that a
vendor must have title to convey, and
the following cases which he cites
support this assumption: Bullard v.
Burgett, 40 N. Y. 314; Andrews v.
Cox, 48 Am. Rep. 68; Faucett v. Osborn, 83 Am. Dec. 278; Kitchell v
Vanader, 1 Blackf. (Ind.) 356.
All these cases support the rule
stated in the early part of this opinion that if the seller has no title he
can convey none; not even to an innocent purchaser.
In appellant's
case, however, the jury found that
Smith had title to the colt which he
could convey to Elam, the appellee,
because appellant had not acquired
title from Smith by his prior contract. The instruction complained of
correctly stated the law of the case
and there was no error in overruling
appellant's motion for a new trial.
Even if the instruction were erroneous, it is harmless. It tends only
to weaken the appellee's title, while
the appellant must recover upon the
strength of his own title. Since the
appellant has established no title in
himself, he cannot recover whether
appellee has title or not, and whether
the instruction is erroneous or not
It is a well established rule of appellate practice that on appeal from a
judgment in replevin the court will
not reverse the judgment for immaterial and harmless errors. Branch
v. Wiseman, 51 Ind. 1; Williams v.
Hoehle, 95 Wis. 510-70 N. W. 556;
13 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of P1. & Pr.
613. In Branch v. Wiseman, supra.
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at what point the course of the master's
the court says: "The appellant also law
employment ends and the purely personal
complains of certain instruction f responsibility of the servant begins.
6. Where both master and servant are at
given and refused by the court. Up
the time jointly engaged in an altercation
to prevent the
on a casual reading, we do not per- with the master's landlord
removal of a fence in dispute between
but
erroneous,
are
they
cieve that
them, and the servant commits an assault

from the evidence, which is all beforc

us, it is very clear that the appellan.
had no right to recover, and there
fore very plain that the instruction,
had not injured him."
Finding no error in the record, the
judgment of the trial court is hereby
affirmed.
SCHULTZ v. PAUL

(No. 2)
Tortious Assault and Battery-Complaint
-Sufficiency-Allegation of Intent to Iniure-When Necessary-Servant's TortVerdict for Master Contrary to LawCourse of Employment-Master's Business
-Master Present, Instructs Servant-Not
Relieved-Refusing Instruction - ErrorVerdict Excessive.
1. A complaint or declaration which
charges a torious assault and battery
against defendants who were at the time
tenants on plaintiff's farm, but also alleges
by way of inducement that plaintiff went
upon'the farm to remove a fence, does not
make plaintiff a trespasser and lay his
action in his own violation of the law, so as
to make it insufficient as stating a cause of
action.
2. To make such complaint or declaration insufficient as a cause of action it must
anpear, not only that plaintiff has violated
the law, but that such violation was the
uroximate or contributing cause of the ini iry comniained of, or that such injury was
the result of some unlawful act in which
both plaintiff and defendant participated at
the time.
3. Where it appears from the pleading
that the assault and battery complained of
is unlawful, it is not necessary to allege
tiat defendant intended to commit the act
or inflict the injury. It is only where it
affirmatively appears from the pleading that
the assault and battery was justifiable, or
was not in itself unlawful, that an allegation of intention to do the injury is essential to the sufficiency of the pleading.
4. Frr instructions tendered, held sufficient apd insufficient, see opinion.

5. Where a servant, while acting in the
eourse of his employment and with a view
to his master's interest, engages in an altercation with another, and as part of the
same transaction commits assault and battery. the master will be held liable, the
court refusing to determine as a matter of

and battery, the master will be held liable,
notwithstanding he gave instruction to the
servant at the time not to strike a blow.
7. It is error of law for whict a new
trial should be granted to refuse a properly
tendered instruction that the master is not
relieved from liability for the servant's
assault and battery merely because at the
time, he instructed the servant not to strike
the injured party.
8. On the foregoing facts, a verdict
which exonorates the master from liability
while finding against the servant, is contrary to law as to the master and the judgment as to him should be reversed.
9. A judgment for $5000 is excessive
which is rendered against a youth of eighteen years who is the unemancipated son of
a tenant farmer of small means and who,
upon severe provocation strikes one blow
thereby permanently ix juring and rendering
useless the right ar , but not otherwise
incapacitating the injured party, such injured party at the time being a bookkeeper,
thirty-eight years of age and earning $150
a month.

Action in tort for $5000 damages
for assault and battery brought by
Fred Schultz against Hale Paul and
William Paul. From a judgment for
$5000 against the defendant, Halb
Paul, said defendant appeals. Affirmed on condition that plaintiff enter remittitur for $2000, otherwise
reversed.
Judgment against plaintiff in favor
of defendant, William Paul from
which plaintiff appears. Reversed.
Arthur B. Hunter and Harry Richwine for Ha!2 Paul and William Paul.
Edwin A. Fredrickson and George
C. Murphv for Fred Schultz.
VURPILLAT, J. Plaintiff, Fred
Schultz, went upon his farm to, remove a fenace and, while so doing, was
struck upon the head by defendant,
Hale Paul, in the presence of William
Paul, co-defendant. The complaint is
in two paragraphs; the first alleging
assault and battery by Hale Paul as
the servant of the co-defendant, Wil-
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liam Paul; the amended third paragraph alleging the same assault and
battery by Hale Paul and charging
the co-defendant with connivance in
its commission. Separate and several
demurrers were overruled and proper exceptions taken. Defendants
filed answer in three paragraphs:
first, general denial; second, son assault demesne; third, defence of pro.
perty. Plaintiff filed reply of traverse de injuriato each of the second
and third paragraphs of answer.
Trial by jury resulted in a general
verdict for plaintiff in the sum of
$5000 against the defendant, Hale
Paul, from which said defendant appeals; and against plaintiff in favor
of defendant, William Paul, from
which plaintiff appeals.
The appellant, Hale Paul, attacks
the sufficiency of each paragraph of
complaint upon the same general
grounds. First, it is said that facts
are alleged which constitute plaintiff
a trespasser and therefore make necessary the allegation that the means
used to eject him were unlawful or
unreasonable. Appellant cites 28
Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law (2nd Ed.)
574 with a reference to its citation of
cases. The only authoritative point
made here is that a tenant in possession may maintain trespass against
the landlord who unlawfully invades
the possession. Both paragraphs of
complain allege that plaintiff was the
owner of the farm and the appellant
and his co-defendant the occupants
thereof. The first paragraph also alleges a lease of the farm by plaintiff
to the defendant, William Paul, and
that, at the time complained of he
went upon the farm. The second
paragraph also alleges that at the
t me complained of, plaintiff went upon the farm for the purpose of re-

moving a fence. These are all the
allegations of the complaint that
might tend affirmatively to establish
plaintiff's character as a trespasser
at the time of the alleged assault and
battery.
These facts fall far short of showing that plaintiff was a trespasser, or
that, as landlord, he unlawfully invaded the possession of the tenant,
the defendant, William Paul. For
ought that appears in the complaint,
plaintiff may have gone upon the
farm at the time complained of, and
for the purpose of removing a fence,
in right of his contract of lease with
the tenant defendant, or with the permission of the tenant, or as a licensee.
But assuming that facts are alleged
in complaint which establish illegal
conduct of plaintiff himself, it must
appear that such illegal conduct was
the proximate or contributing causc
of the injury complained of. Hall v.
Corcoran, 107 Mass. 251-9 Am. Rep
30; Koepkae v. Peper, 155 Iowa 687136 N. W. 902-41 L. R. A. (N. S.)
773; Gilmore v. Fuller, 198 Ill. 13065 N. E. 84-60 L. R. A. (N. S.) 326.
In Hall v. Corcoran, supra, it was
said by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts: "Whether the form of action is in contract or tort, the test in
each case is whether, when all the
facts are disclosed, the action appears
to be founded in a violation of law
in which the plaintiff has taken part."
Thus, where the plaintiff and defendant participated in a charivari
party made illegal by the criminal
code of Illinois, and plaintiff was shot
and seriously injured by reason of
the alleged carelessness of the defendant, it was held as a matter of law
that plaintiff had no right of action
Gilmore v. Fuiller, supra. See also
Higgens v. Minaghan, 78 Wis. 602-
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47 N. W. 941-11 L. R. A. 138-23 Am.
St. Rep. 428. Where the parties are
in pari delicto, that is, in equal fault,
neither is in a position to ask relief
of the court from a situation caused
by his own wrong doing, whether it
be his illegal contract or his tortious
act. Anson on Contracts (4th Ed.)
262; Chapin on Torts 237! Hall v.
Corcoran, supra.
But where the illegal conduct of
the plaintiff, whether participated in
by defendant or not, is not itself the
proximate or contributing cause of
the injury inflicted upon plaintiff by
defendant, the plaintiff may recover,
notwithstanding such illegal conduct.
In Welch v. Wesson, 6 Gray (Mass.)
505, sustaining a judgment for plaintiff for the willful running down and
breaking of his sleigh by the defendant, though plaintiff and defendant
were at the time racing illegally for
a purse, it is said by the court: "the
mutual misconduct of the parties in
one particular cannot exenfpt the defendant from his obligation to respond for the injurious consequences
of his own illegal misbehavior in another." "The distinction," says the
same court in another case, ,'is between that which directly or proximately produces or helps to produce a
result as an efficient cause, and that
which is a necessary condition or attendant circumstance." Newcomb v.
Boston Protective Dept. 146 Mass.
596 (604)-16 N. E. 555-4 Am. St.
Rep. 354.
The paragraphs of complaint do
not show any illegal conduct of plaintiff which might be the proximate or
contributing cause of the injury complained of and they are therefore not,
for that reason, insufficient.
The second ground of attack upon
the paragraphs of complaint is that

they do not allege that in the commission of the assault and battery,
the appellant intended to cause the
injury. This may be considered with
the third cause assigned for the insufficiency of the paragraphs, namely: that, since an assault and battery
is a crime, all the elements constituting assault and battery must be alleged in the complaint.
Precisely because assault and battery is an unlawful act, unless the
facts specially plead show otherwise, it is not necessary to allege that
the consequent injuries inflicted by
the defendant were intentional. And
precisely because this is not a criminal prosecution for assault and battery, but is a civil action for the tort,
or private wrong, it is not necessary
to allege and prove the crime. In 2
Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law 953 it is
said: "To constitute an indictable
assault and battery there must be an
intent, express or implied, to do injury to another. But one may be liable in a civil action for assault and
battery where there was an entire absence of intent to do any injury, the
ground of liability being that the assault was committed in pursuance of
an unlawful act or was the result of
negligence." In the following cases
judgments for damages were sustained on the theory of assault and battery where there existed no intention
to do the injury: a man for colliding
with another while riding a bicycle
on the sidewalk in violation of a city
ordinance, Mercer v. Corbin, 117 Ind.
450-3 L. R. A. 221; a lad for kicking
another on the shin during school,
Vosbury v. Putney, 80 Wis. 523-50
N. W. 403-14 L. R. A. 227; a sewing
machine company for the act of its
agent who, in reclaiming a machine,
tipped it and caused the purchaser
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to be thrown and injured, Singer
Sewing Mach. Co. v. Phipps, 49 Ind.
App. 116; a woman for an assault
and battery committed by her husband as her agent upon another wo
man, Shane v. Lyon (Mass.) 51 N. E.
976. The case of Scott v. Shepherd,
familiarly known as the "Squib
Case," is an illustration of the civil
liability for assault and battery
where no criminal intent exists. In
the case of Kirkwood v. Miller.
(Tenn.) 5 Speed. 455-73 Am. Dec.
134, for the killing of a slave in fear
of a general revolt, the court said:
"That the same evidence which would
excuse the defendant from criminal
responsibility would relieve them
from civil liability, is not true as a
general rule," and further, "that criminal purpose and intent, express or
implied, required to constitute crime,
is not in all cases essential to an action for injuries to person or property."
The cases cited by counsel for appellant, instead of supporting his contention, rather sustain the pleading
and the verdict in the case. In Kline
v. Kline, 158 Ind. 602, sustaining a
judgment for damages founded on an
assault by threats of murder and arson, the court says: "Even if we
were to grant for the sake of the argument, that there was not an assault
within the meaning of the criminal
statute, yet there was such an assault as clearly subjected the offender
to a civil action at common-law."
The case of Newall v. Witcher, 53 Vt.
589-38 Am. Rep. 703, does not hold
that an assault must be criminal to
sustain a judgment in the civil action. It merely condemns the conduct of the defendant as unlawful in
any event; and, as tending to establish its unlawful character, says that,

if perpetrated, the act would be criminal. The cases of Gilmore v. Fuller, supra, Vosberg v. Putney, supra,
and Raefeldt v. Koenig, (Wis.) 140
N. W. 56, all cited by appellant, support the rule that, where the facts
specially plead show that the act complained of is not in itself unlawful,
then there must appear the allegation
that the act was done with an intention to inflict the injury. In appellant's case, however, no facts are
plead in either paragraph of complaint giving an innocent or justifiable character to the assault and battery, which is in itself unlawful.
The case of Gilmore v. Fuller,
supra, seems to lend support to appellant's contention that intention to
do the injury must be alleged because
assault and battery which is a crime
is charged. In this case the court
held that because there was no allegation or proof that the injury inflicted
by the defendant was intentional, the
trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury to find for defendant
on the first and second counts of the
declaration. Although assault and
battery is clearly charged in these
counts, the court says "an assault is
charged" and then quotes Greenleaf's
statement of the rule of law applicable to mere criminal assault, as follows: "The intention to do harm is
of the essence of an assault." 2
Greenl. Ev. (16th Ed.) Sec. 83. The
court here makes no distinction between assault and assault and battery, and also fails to distinguish between civil and criminal actions.
These distinctions are vital.
In the case of Vosberg v. Putney,
supra, in which precisely the same
issue was presented, the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin says: "The jury
having found that the defendant, in
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touching the plaintiff, did not intend
to do him any harm, the defendant
maintains that the plaintiff has nc
cause of action, and that defendant'f
motion for judgment on the special
verdict should have been granted. In
support of this proposition counsel
quote from 2 Greenl. Ev. (16th Ed.)
Sec. 83, the rule that "The intention
to do harm is of the essence of an assault." "Such is the rule no doubt,"
says the court, "in -actions or prosecutions for mere assaults. But this
is an action to recover damages for
an alleged assault and battery" (Our
italics). Holding that this rule does
not apply in the case (and for the
same reason it does not apply in the
other case) the Wisconsin Court's decision is contrary to that in the case
of Gilmore v. Fuller.
In reversing a conviction for assault and battery with intent to kill
for refusing to instruct the jury that,
to convict, they must find that the
shooting was intentional, the Supreme Court of Alabama, in the cast
of McGee v. State, 58 So. 1008, says.:
"In civil as distinguished from criminal actions, an intent to injure is not
essential to the liability of the persons committing the assault and bat.
tery."
Citing Carlton v. Henry,
supra, the Alabama Court continues:
"In fact we think that, at times,
courts have fallen into error in applying or attempting to apply, the
rules applicable only to civil actions
for assault and battery, or trespass
to the person, to the facts in criminal
prosecutions. In a criminal prosecution for an assault and battery, except as hereinafter shown, the intent
to injure is one of the essential elements of the offence; in civil action
the intent, while pertinent and

relevant, is not essential."

(Our

italics).
Both Greenleaf on Ev. and Hilliard
on Torts; which are cited as authority
for the holding in the case of Gilmore
v. Fuller, show the misapplication of
the rule of intent in mere assault to
an action for injuries by unlawful
assault and battery. Neither does
the case of Paxton v. Boyer, 67 Ill.
132-16 Am. Rep. 615, support the
holding. In that case the plaintiff
could not recover because the assault
charged was committed by the defendant in the exercise of his lawful
right of self-defence, and in such
case, only wanton infliction of injuries by the defendant will entitle
plaintiff to recover. And so in the
case of Gilmore v. Fuller itself, the
plaintiff could not recover; not because the rule of simple assault applies, that "intention to do the harm
is of the essence of an assault," but
because both plaintiff and defendant
were at the time of the injury complained of, engaged in an unlawful
act.
To make the case of Gilmore v. Fuller, supra, conform in principle and
precedent to the great weight of authority, we think the decision must
be restricted to a holding that where
both plaintiff and defendant participate in the commission of the same
illegal act, plaintiff cannot recover
for injuries inflicted upon him by the
defendant "unless the defendant acted wantonly." That this is perhaps
what the court intended to hold is indicated by a quotation of the court
from Beach on Contributory Negligence (3rd Ed.) Sec. 47, in support
of the other branch of the case. The
quotation is as follows: "Where the
plaintiff is obliged to lay the foundation of his action in his own violation
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of the law he cannot recover. And
where the illegal act also contributes
to produce the injury of which he
complains, he has no action unless the
defendant acted wantonly."
The right of personal security is
one of the absolbte rights of the individual, and a violation of such right
is always actionable at common-law
whether the act be criminal or not.
2 Bl. Comm. 119; Cooley on Torts 29.
"Responsibility for the result of a
wrongdoer's act or omission does not
depend on whether he intended to
produce it." Chapin on Torts 63.Nor is it necessary to the sufficiency
of the declaration or complaint for
tort to allege all the elements of the
crime which such tort might also cbnstitute. Benson v. Bain, 99 Ind. 156,
citing 2 Work's Pr. 645; 2 Chitty P1.
(13th Am. Ed.) 852; Bullen & Leak
Prec. 411;-Oliver Prec. 719; 1 Estee
P1. 560. See also Schlosser v. Griffith,
125 Ind. 431.
There was no error in the trial
court's ruling on the separate ana
several demurrer to the first and
amended third paragraphs of complaint. The same reasons and authorities which sustain the complaint
support the verdict on the law as to
the case of the appellant Hale Paul.
The answers to the interrogatories
are in accord with the general verdict
and the court therefore committed no
error in overruling appellant's motion for judgment thereon. See Hunter v. Elam reported in this issue of
the Reporter.
As cause for a new trial appellant
alleges error of the court in refusing
his instruction No. 1. This instruction was correctly iefused, because it
assumes that the appellant was lawfully acting in self-defence. Furthermore the matter of this instruction

was fully covered by court's instruction No. 6.
Instructions numbered seven and
ten, tendered by the plaintiff ancd
given by the court over appellant's
objection, are attacked as erroneous.
Considering these two instructions together as they should be considered
because they relate to the single subject-matter of compensatory damages, and then viewing them in the light
of all the instructibns given to the
jury, they may fairly be construed as
instructing the jury that, if they find
for the plaintiff, they should award
him such compensatory damages, the
elements of which are correctly stated
in number ten, as in their sound judgment, under all the circumstances in
the case, theyV deemed sufficient to
compensate plaintiff for the loss sustained, not exceeding the sum demanded. We do not think these instructions are open to the objection
that they are calculated to direct the
jury either as to the elements or the
amount of damages to be awarded.
Having found no error of law in
the record that might have effected
the substantial rights of the appellant or unduly influenced the jury,
we are not disposed to disturb the
verdict and its affirmance by the trial
court, except to sustain appellant's
contention assigned as a cause for
new trial, that the damages assessed
by the jury are excessive. Three considerations have prompted us to render this decision reducing the award
of damages. First the youth and station in life of the appellant and his
ability to pay the judgment. This
feature of the case may not have been
considered by the jury and trial court.
The record, however, discloses it and
it is a very proper circumstance to be
considered as a measure of damage.
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Row v. Moses, (S. C.) 67 Am. Dec.
560 and note. Appellant is a youth of
eighteen years, the unemancipated
son of a tenant farmer having little
of the world's goods. A five thousand
dollar judgment imposed upon him in
his situation in life would be inflict
ing a grievous and permanent injury
much in excess of any damage sustained by the plaintiff, even if we concede that plaintiff's injury is permanent. The second consideration is
that the assault and battery vas induced by the severe provocation of
plaintiff. It is a mitigating circumstance, at least, that plaintiff's action
was arbitrary in going upon the tenant's farm, taking the law into his
own hands, and persistently and, in
spite of repeated warnings given him
by both defendants, trying to destroy
the fence that kept the tenant's cows
in the clover and from the corn. This
provocation was sufficiently exasperating to coerce the appellant to strike
the one blow with a near-by stick
that felled the plaintiff, but, however
provoking in fact, is not sufficient
provocation in law to bar plaintiff's
right of recovery for the assault and
battery committed. The third consideration is the character of plaintiff's injury as a permanent one. Upon no other element could such an as.
sessment of damages be made a
would necessitate exhausting plaintiff's demand for five thousand dollars. The evidence discloses that
plaintiff's left arm and hand are
unimpaired and his mind unaffected. He may be permanently
injured but he is not wholly incapacitated. Waiving aside the possibility of recovery through an operation which he may not legally be compelled to undergo to effect a cure, it
is quite within the range of possi-

bility, as courts may judicially know,
for defendant to become mightier
with the pen in his left hand than he
ever was with his right on the pen.
Plaintiff's age of thirty-eight years
and his earning power of $150 per
month are considered. We cannot in
justice countenance a judg:ment in
this case for more than three thousand dollars. For cases on reducing
verdicts see Rowe v. Moses, supra;
Elliott v..Sawyer, (Me.) 77 Atl. 782;
Gunderson v. Northwestern Elevator
Co., (Minn.) b9 N. W. 694; Mark v.
Fink, 147 N. W. 279. As to duty of
injured party to undergo operation,
see Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. ]3oone,
(Ky.) 202 S. W. 489; Loban v. Wabash Ry. Co., (Mo.) 141 S. W. 440;
Birmingham Ry. L. & P. Co. v. Anderson, (Ala.) 50 So. 1021.
The plaintiff, appealing from the
judgment against him in favor of the
defendant, William Paul, assigns as
error for reversal of such judgment,
the overruling of his motion for a new
trial and that the verdict is contrary
to law. Plaintiff's first paragraph of
complaint against the defendant William Paul is upon the theory of master and servant, and his amended
third paragraph, upon the theory of
connivance, counseling and urging
his co-defendant, Hale Paul, to commit the assault and battery alleged.
On the connivance theory of liability, Judge Cooley makes the following comprehensive statement of
the law: "All persons who command,
instigate, promote, encourage, advise,
countenance, co-operate, aid or abet
the commission of a trespass by another, or who approve of it after it is
done for their benefit, are co-trespassers with the person committing
the trespass, and are each liable as
principals to the same extent and in
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the same manner as if they had performed the wrongful act themselves."
Cooley on Torts 133; Chapin on Torts
230; Chitty P1. 208; Greenl. Ev. Sec.
41.
Hale Paul is the minor son of the
co-defendant, William Paul, and at
the time of committing the assault
and battery on plaintiff, and for a
long time prior thereto, was residing
with his father and working for him
in the operation of the farm. The
farm was owned by the plaintiff and
was occupied by William Paul az
tenant. The defendants had constructed a temporary wire fence between a clover field and a corn field
so as to enable him to pasture their
cows on the clover and keep them
from the corn. Plaintiff, on the occasion complained of, went to the
farm to remove this fence, taking
with him tools for the purpose. On
arriving at the farm he entered the
clover field from the highway and began immediately to remove the wire
from the fence. Both defendants
were at the time engaged in plowing
corn in the adjoining field. The son,
Hale Paul, frst to observe plaintiff at
the fence, left his plow and rushed to
plaintiff, shouting as he ran, "Shultz,
damn you, let that fence alone." He
repeated these words upon arriving
at the fence and added, "or I'll make
you." At this point the father, William Paul, leaving his plow also came
hurriedly to the place and also shouted, "Schultz, you let that fence
alone." Plaintiff utterly ignored the
defendants and their warnings, ana
thereupon the son, Hale Paul, picked
up a heavy stick and once more said
to plaintiff, "Damn you, Schultz, let
that fence alone or I'll make you."
Then William Paul told the son not
to strike plaintiff. Plaintiff continued

to pull staples and loosen the wire,
and then Hale Paul swung the club
over the top of the fence and struck
plaintiff on the left side of the head
felling him to the fround. The jury
in their answers to interrogatories
found that plaintiff used no threatening language and assumed no menacing attitude toward Hale Paul as testified by defendants. The foregoing
facts were virtually admitted by defendants in testimony.
Do the facts as here stated establish the liability of the defendant
William Paul, upon either or both
theories of complaint. The cases are
numerous and interesting upon both
these propositions.
To dwell at
length on many of them would be to
make the opinion of great strength,
We must, however, in view of the importance of the issues involved in the
case, state in substance, the operative
facts and the decisions of a few analogous cases.
In Willi v. Lucas, (Mo.) 19 S. W.
726, defendant Lucas, a liveryman
was hired by Willi (plaintiff's husband) to overtake plaintiff on the
road. Three times defendant drove
his team ahead of plaintiff, the last
time so that she could not pass. When
asked to permit plaintiff of pass, defendant said, "Shut your damn
mouth. I'm driving this team according to orders." Then, while defendant sat in his buggy, to use the
language of the court, "in such a position that he could not have seen plaintiff without looking out from the side
of the buggy, the back curtain being
down and the hind end of the buggy
being towards (plaintiff)," Willi got
out of defendant's buggy, went back
to his wife's buggy and shot her. A
nonsuit of the wife's action against
Lucas was reversed.
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In Hilmes vs. Stroebel, 59 Wis. 7417 N. W. 539, for assault and battery
the case against the co-defendants of
Stroebel was nonsuited. These defendants accompanied Stroebel and
prevented the proprietor of the place
from interfering with Stroebel's assault upon plaintiff. They also made
certain remarks indicating hostility
to plaintiff, but in no manner took
part in the assault and battery itself.
Case reversed for error of the trial
court in entering nonsuit.
In Reed v. Peck et al., (Mo.) 63 S.
W. 734, it appears that a street in
front of plaintiff's house was graded
without"an ordinance authorizing it.
Action for trespass against those who
did the work and the mayor and the
On appeal
street committeemen.
from judgment for plaintiff the court
said, "The grading of the street was,
undoubtedly, done without lawful authority; was a trespass. There wa.
no ordinance providing for such grading. And, while the work was actually performed by the street commissioner, there was, it seems, evidence tending to prove that Mayor
Guitar and Street Committeemen,
Peck and Watson, were present from
time to time superintending and encouraging the work. The judgment
was affirmed.
In Moir v. Hopkins, 16 Ill. 313-63
Am. Dec. 312 the defendant was held
liable where his agent directed a servant to "go and get" Hopkin's team,
meaning with Hopkin's consent, and
the servant got the team without
seeking such consent, and in its use
killed one of the horses.
There is sufficient evidence in this
record to have sustained a verdict
against the defendant, William Paul.
on the connivance theory, and to have
justified a reversal of the judgment

if the trial court had entered a nonsuit. The added relation of mastei
and servant strengthens this theory
of liability.
That the relation of master and
servant existed between the defend
ants at 'the time of the assault and.
battery committed by defendant Hale
Paul, is admitted by the defendant.
themselves as witnesses on the trial.
To this relation applies the doctrine
of respondeat -superior. Chapin on
Torts 211. Since the judgment as to
Hale Paul, the servant, is sustained,
and since the relation of master and
servant is established by the record
admissions of the defendants them.
selves, there remains to be determin.
ed only whether the assault and battery' of the servant was committed ir
the course of the servant's employment and with a view of the master's
interest. If so, then the defendant,
William Paul, as master, is liable and
the verdict exhonorating him is contrary to law.
There are many cases holding thc
master liable for the assault and battery of the servant, although the mas
ter was not present, in no way authorized or justified or participated
in it, and although he expressly instructed his servant not to commit it
Palmeri v. Manhatten Ry. Co. 133 N.
Y. 261-30 N. E. 1001-16 L. R. A. 13628 Am. Rep. 632; McClung v. Dearborn, 134 Pa. St. 396-19 Atl. 698-8
L. R. A. 204-19 Am. St. Rep. 708;
Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. Phipps
49 Ind. App. 116. See note to Richie
v. Waller, 27 L. R. A. 161.
That the servant, Hale Paul, was
acting in the course of his employment in the commission of the assault
and battery upon the praintiff is
clearly decided by the Kentucky Court
of Appeals, in the case of New Ellers-
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lie Fishing Club v. Stewart, 93 S. W.

598-9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 475. The issues of the two cases are the same
Proctor was employed by the fishing
club to prevent persons from fishing
in their ponds who had not the privilege to do so. Thinking that plaintiff had not such privilege, Proctor
engaged in an altercation with him
to prevent his fishing and in so doing cut him with a knife. In deciding
the case the court said: "It is difficult to define with accuracy the
point at which the master's liability
for the acts of his servant ends; but
under the facts of this case, Proctor,
when he attempted to prevent appellee from fishing, and when the altercation between them commenced, was
clearly acting within the scope of his
employment, and the assault and bat
tery complained of was merely a con
tinuation of the first act. There was
no appreciable lenth of time between them. Everything that was
done happened on the premises in the
control of the fishing club, and where
Proctor had authority as its agent
Where the agent begins a quarrel
while acting within the scope of his
agency, and immediately follows it
up by a violent assault, the master
will be liable, as the law under the
circumstances will not undertake to
say when, in the course of the assault
he ceased to act as agent and acted
upon his own responsibility." Another case in point here is Dickson v.
Waldron, 135 Ind. 524-34 N. E. 50635 N. E. 1-24 L. R. A. 483-41 Am
St. Rep. 440.
That the master, William Paul, is
liable for his servant's assault and
battery upon the plaintiff, despite his
instruction given to the servant at
the time, not to strike the plaintiff, is
clearly decided by the case of Grant

v. Singer Sewing Machine Co., 190
Mass. 489-77 N. E. 480-6 L. R. A. 567,
and also by the case of Borden v.
Felch, 109 Mass. 154. In the first
case Sexton, as general agent for the
company, together with one Andrews
whom he had hired to recover a sewing machine, went to the home of
plaintiff who had contracted for the
purchase of the machine. Seeing that
trouble was about to ensue, Sexton
said to Andrews: "Mr. Andrews, you
need not proceed any further. I will
send and replevin the sewing machine." Despite this admonition or
instruction to Andrews, he commit
ted the assault and battery upon the
plaintiff for which the court affirmed
a judgment against the Sewing Ma
chine Co. The court says: "It is
settled that the defendant would bc
liable for force used by Andrews a
a means of retaking the machine
even if he had been told not to usforce. (Cases cited). The defendant's liability does not depend upor
his having been authorized expressly
or impliedly to use force, but upon
his having used force as a means of
doing what he was employed to dc
(Citing cases)." The case of Borden
v. Felch,supra, is also in point. In
that case as in this there was an altercation between two adverse claimants to right in land. The servant of
one, despite the instruction given him
by the master at the time, committed
assault and battery upon the plaintiff
for which the master was held liable.
C. J. Watkins, in the case of Duggins
v. Watson, 15 Ark. 127, says: "The
only safe rule of law is that the master is liable for the tortious act of his
servant engaged in his employment,
though done willfully, without orders
or even against orders. See note 35
Am. Dec. 192.
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The facts in this case, upon the admission of the defendants themselves
are stronger than the operative facts
of the cases cited, and there is no escape from the conclusion that the verdict in favor of the master is clearly
contrary to law. The verdict is contrary to law also for the reason that
the trial court refused to give to the
jury plaintiff's instruction No. 6. By
this instruction the jury were instructed that the master, William
Paul, would be liable for the act of
the servant, -Hale Paul, in this case
"even though William Paul expressly
ordered Hale Paul not to commit the
assault." This instruction correctly
stated the law, as we have found the
law to be, was applicable to the facts
of the case, was not covered in any
of the court's instructions, its giving
or failure to give would directly affect the verdict, and therefore, its rejection by the trial court was such
error as makes the verdict contrary
to law. Robinson v. Chandler, 56
Ind. 575; Cline v. Lindsey, 110 Ind.
337; Healey v. Johnson (Iowa), 103

N. W. 92; Lewis v. Schultz, 98 Iowa
341-67 N. W. 266. The refusal to
give the instruction was also such error as entitled plaintiff to a new
trial.
For the reason that the verdict in
favor of the defendant, William Paul,
is contrary to law, and for the reason
that the trial court erred in overruling plaintiff's motion for a new trial
the judgment against plaintiff in favor of William Paul must be reversed
and such judgment is hereby reversed
with instruction to sustain plaintiff's
motion for a new trial as to defend.
ant, William Paul.
If the plaintiff will file a remittitut
for the sum of two thousand dollars
within ten days after the filing of thcertified opinion of this court in the
lower court, this judgment against
the appellant, Hale Paul, is hereby affirmed; otherwise, it is reversed with
instruction to grant a new trial to
Hale Paul.
The cause is hereby remanded for
further proceeding not inconsistent
with this opinion.
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BIRIEF OF M. EDWARD DORAN IN CASE OF
HUNTER v. ELAM.
In the Supreme Court of Notre Dame

refused, and that he now sues for
possession.
The defendant demurred to the
William Hunter, Appellant,
complaint.
VS.
The defendant filed an answer in
John Elam, Appellee.
two paragraphs, the first in general
Appealed from the Notre Dame denial, and the second alleging that
he was a 'bona fide' purchaser.
Circuit Court.
The plaintiff demurred to the second
paragraph of the answer.
Appellant.
Brief for the
Trial was had by jury and both
parties submitted interrogatories.
By Michael Edward Doran.
The plaintiff made a motion for
'non obstante venedicto,'
judgment
NATURE OF ACTION.
based on the replies given by the jury
A certain Perry Smith was the to his interrogatories.
The plaintiff filed his motion for a
ownerof a fine Hambletonian mare
which William Hunter, the Appellant new trial based on the following
here, hired for the purpose of breed- grounds: (1) The verdict is contrary
ing. The mare was left with Smith, to law. (2) The court erred in giving
it being agreed that if a foal should of its own motion, over plaintiff's
result Smith would keep and train it objection, instruction number eleven.
for the appellant. A colt was foaled (3) The special finding of facts as
and Smith kept and trained it pur- revealed by the answer to the plainsuant to the agreement. About the tiff's interrogatories, are inconsistent
time the colt was ready for the with the verdict.
appellant's purpose, Smith sold it to
the appellee, John Elam. When the HOW THE ISSUES WERE DECIDED AND WHAT THE
appellant learned of the sale he went
JUDGMENT WAS.
to Elam and demanded that the colt
be given to him. Elam refused;
The jury which tried the cause rewhereupon Hunter instituted this action in replevin. The jury returned a turned the following verdict:
verdict for the appellee and the apState of Indiana,
pellant now prosecutes his appeal to
County of St. Joseph, SS:
this court.
In the Notre Dame Circuit Court.
WHAT THE ISSUES WERE.
The complaint was in one paragraph alleging that the plaintiff was
the owner and lawfully entitled to
the immediate possession of the colt
in question; that the plaintiff made a
demand on the defendant which was

September term, 1919.

William Hunter
Verdict.
V.
John Elam.
We, the jury, find for the defendant, and against the plaintiff.
Emmett A. Rohyans,
Foreman.
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The defendant's demurrer to the
complaint was overruled, to which
ruling defendant excepted. The plaintiff's demurrer to the defendant's
second paragraph of answer was sustained, and the defendant excepted to
the ruling. The motion of the plaintiff for a judgment 'non obstante
veredicto' based on the jury's replies
to plaintiff's interrogatories was
overruled, to which ruling exception
was taken by the plaintiff. The court
overruled the plaintiff's motion for a
new trial and the plaintiff excepted to
the ruling.
The court then entered the following judgment: "The jury having returned a finding for the defendant, it
is therefor ordered, adjudged, and
decreed by the court that the plaintiff take nothing by this action and
that the defendant recover of and
from the plaintiff his cost laid out,
expended, and taxed at forty-three
dollars and ten cents ($43.10), all of
which is finally and fully ordered,
adjudged, and decreed by the court."

attend the latter's wife; after leaving
the house he noticed a mare in a
nearby field, and he told Smith he
would give him one hundred dollars
for a colt from her; Smith replied
that he did not think the mare would
produce a colt, so he would not take
the chance of paying for breeding,
because prior attempts had failed; he
then offered to give Smith forty dollars for the services of the mare for
breeding and then pay the stallion
fee if Smith would breed the mare to
a horse of his selection; Smih accepted this offer. Hunter told Smith
he would want him to keep the colt if
it were foaled and train it until it
was ready for his services; when he
would call for it and pay what these
duties were reasonably worth; Smith
agreed to do this; he then went to the
home of Mr. Walsh and arranged for
the use of his stallion in breeding it
to Smith's mare; he paid Mr. Walsh
a fee of ten dollars; he saw the colt
shortly after it was foaled and at
frequent intervals thereafter; when
he learned of the alleged sale of the
ERRORS RELIED ON FOR
colt by Smith to Elam, he went to
REVERSAL.
Elam and told him he was the owner
of the colt and demanded that it be
(1) The verdict is contrary to the given to him; 'Elam refused, so he
law.
instituted this action.
(2) The verdict is contrary to the
See bill of exceptions No. 1; record
replies given by the jury to the ap- page -.
pellant's interrogatories.
(3) The court erred in overruling
Perry Smith was the next witness
the appellant's motion for a new trial. called for the plaintiff. He testified
to the agreement between Hunter and
CONDENSED STATEMENT OF
himself in the same terms as was disTHE EVIDENCE.
closed by Dr. Hunter's testimony. He
said, that he accepted the forty dolWilliam Hunter, the plaintiff, who lars for the services of the mare bewas called as the first witness in his cause he was certain to get this
own behalf, testified hs follows that: amount, whereas if he took one hunhe was a South Bend physician and dred dollars for a colt, a colt might
that on September 5th, 1916, he called not be foaled and he would lose by
at the home of one Perry Smith to the transaction; that he bred the
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mare to Walsh's stallion; that he did
not pay the fee to Walsh; that the
colt was foaled on August 10th, 1917;
that he ktp, fed, and cared for the
colt until July 5th, 1919; that the colt
at that time was trained and fit for
driving put'poses; that on July 5th,
1919, the defendant, Elam offered
him two hundred dollars for the colt;
that he accepted the offer; that he
received the two hundred dollars
from Elam in cash and that Elam
then took the colt away with him;
that he had never seen Elam before
July 5th, 1919; that he told Elam
that he was the owner of the colt.
See bill of exceptions, No. 1,
Page -.

called at his home and demanded the
colt and he refused this demand.
See bill of exceptions, No. 1, Record
page -.

The next witness called by the defendant was Clifford O'Sullivan He
testified that :-he was a lawyer practicing in South Bend; he was with
John Elam when he purchased the
colt in question from Perry Snith;
that Smith said he was the owner of
the colt; Elam gave Smith two hundred dollars for the colt and Elam
then took it home with him; that he
had never seen Perry Smith before
this day.
See bill of exceptions, No. 1, Record
Page

The next witness for the plaintiff,
Mr. Walsh, testified that he was a
farmer; that he was the owner of a
stallion; that h ehad been paid ten
dollars by William Hunter for the
services of his stallion in breeding
Smith's mare; the mare was bred on
September 7th, 1916.
See bill of exceptions, Record
page -.

-.

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES.
The appellant claims that the contract between him and Perry Smith
was an agreement for the sale of the
services of the mare for breeding,
and thus title to the colt has always
reposed in the appellant.
McCarthy v. Blevns, 26 Am. Dec.
262.
Maize v. Bowman, 19 S. W. 589.
The possession of the colt by Perry
Smith coupled with his claim of
ownership did not give him such a
right in the colt as to enable him to
pass a good title to a 'bona fide' purchaser for value.
Ballard v. Burgett, 40 N. Y. 314.
Andrews v. Cox, 48 Am. lRep. 68.
Fawcett v. Osborn, 83 Am. Dec. 278
Kitchell v. Vanadar, 1 Black. 356
(Ind.)

The first witness called for the defendant was John Elam. He testified
that he was an insurance broker:he had passed the farm of Perry
Smith on July 5th, 1919 ;-he saw a
colt in the pasture-Perry Smith told
him that he was the owner of it ;-he
offered Smith two hundred dollars
for the cold ;.-Smith accepted, and he
(Elam) thereupon paid him two hundred dollars in cash; then took the
colt to his home in South Bnd; prior
ARGUMENT.
to July 5th, 1919, he had never seen
Perry Smith which is the subject of
The real gTounds upon which this
this action; he did not investigate,
is based are points of law
appeal
but relied solely on Smith's averment
as follows: (1) Was the
are
which
of ownership and the fact that Smith
Smith and Hunter
between
contract
had possession; that William Hunter
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an agreement for the sale of a thing
having neither an actual nor a potential existence? (2) Was the court's
instruction number eleven, given
over the appellant's objection, a correct statement of the law? Let us
consider these questions and by reviewing the authorities determine
whether justice has been rendered to
the appellant in the court below.
The appellant herein maintains,
and the evidence of Perry Smith and
William Hunter shows that the appellant gave forty dollars ($40.00)
for the use of the mare for breeding.
Review for a moment the appellant's
interrogatories submitted in the
court below and see if the answers
given to them by the jury do not substantiate our contention.
(Question) Did William Hunter
offer Perry Smith one hundred dollars for a colt from his mare?
(Answer) Yes. Emmet A. Royhans, Foreman.
(Question) If William Hunter did
make this offer was it not accepted by
Perry Smith?
(Answer) No. Emmett A. Royhans, Foreman.
(Question) Did William Hunter
offer Perry Smith forty dollars for
the services of his mare for breeding?
(Answer) Yes. Emmett A. Royhans, Foreman.
(Question) If William Hunter did
make this offer was it accepted?
(Answer) Yes. Emmet A. Royhans, Foreman.
Now just what did this contract of
forty dollars for the services of the
mare for breeding mean? Simply
this, that William Hunter was legally
bound to pay Perry Smith the sum
of forty dollars regardless of whether
a foal resulted from the breeding or
not; but if a foal should result then it
would be the property of William
Hunter. This agreement was not for
the sale of the colt and thus not under

the rule applicable to the sale of a
thing having neither an actual nor a
potential existence, but it was a contract for the use of the mare for a
certain definite purpose. Can any
more logical interpretation be Placed
upon this agreement? If you hold
that the second offer of William Hunter was for a colt, then you are holding the fact that Perry Smith refused
one hundred dollars for a colt but accepted an offer of forty dollars for it;
this would be absurd.
In sustaining these contentions we
wish to consider the case of McCarthy v. Blevins, 26 AM. Dec. 262.
A party named Rogers bred his
horse to a certain Butler's mare with
the understanding that, if a colt
should result, it should belong t6 one
Pleasant Blevins, an infant. A colt
was foaled and the defendant below
McCarthy, purchased it and the mare
from Butler. Blevins, by his next
friend, brought this action against
McCarthy to recover the colt. The
defendant insisted that no title vested by the contract between Butler and
Rogers, no colt being in existence;
that no right can be communicated to
property of which the bargainor has
no title in possession, actually or potentially. The court in the course of
its decision said: "In horse growing
districts, mares of distinguisehd reputation are constantly let in effect
to breed from, the owner of the mare
agreeing to take so much for the
chance of a colt for one season, he retaining in his possession the mare because too valuable to be trusted with
another. That the foal in such cases,
when dropped, is the property of the
hirer of the mare has never been the
subject of doubt. Had Blevins taken
the mare into his possession, paying
so much per annum for her use
generally, then he would have been
authorized to use her as a brood mare,
and to retain the foal. The feeding
and attention by the owner could
make no difference; it was generally
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a hiring. On this foot the plaintiff is
entitled to recover. Rogers hired his
mare for Blevins for the season of
gestation, for her use in breeding; he
was to use her in this particular way;
still Blevins is entitled to the increase
as if she had been hired for the year
generally, with the use unrestricted."
We have seen fit to set out this case
at length because it so clearly points
out the fact that a contract for the
services of a mare for breeding is a
thing distinct and apart from an
agreement for the purchase of the
expected foal, and thus does not come
under the rule applicable to the sale
of a thIng having neither an actual
nor a potential existence. The reasoning and principals expounded in
the above case are supported by the
Kentucky decision of Maize v. Bowman, 19 S.W. 589, in which the court
held that the sale of the services of a
mare for the purpose of breeding is
not an agreement to sell something
which is not 'in esse', and therefor
void, but a valid agreement for the
use of the mare for a special purpose.
Since it is logically established that
the appellant hired the breeding right
to the mare, we maintain that upon
reason as well as upon authority, the
title to the foal from the time of conception until the present day has
been vested in the appellant, unaffected by the transaction between
Perry Smith and the appellee, John
Elam.
Let us examine the court's instruction number eleven given over the
appellant's objection which deals
with the doctrine of bona fide purchaser. The instruction is as follows:
"If you find from the evidence that
the defendant, Elam, and the said
Smith contracted for the sale of the
colt in question; that Elam was an
innocent purchaser of the said colt,

paying therefor to the said Smith the
sum of two hundred dollars; that
Smith was then and there in the
open, notorious exclusive possession
of the colt, claiming ownership and
so representing himself to Elam at
the time; that Elam inquired of the
aid Smith as to his ownership of the
colt and the sale thereof; and you
further find that Elam the defendant
at the time of the purchase of the
colt and payment therefor had no
notice of any executory contract between Hunter and Smith for said
colt, or of any claim by Hunter of any
right or interest in said colt; and you
further find from the evidence that
the defendant Elam had no knowledge whatever that should put a reasonably prudent man upon inquiry,
then, I instruct you, the defendant,
Elam, became the owner of the colt
i nsuit, regardless of any rights and
obligations existing under said contract between plaintiff and Smith
relative to the colt, and your verdict
should be for the defendant."
It is our firm belief that this instruction of the court is clearly
erroneous and was the prime cause of
a verdict being returned against the
appellant herein. We do not deny
that Smith was in open, notorious
possession, and we further admit
that he claimed ownership when he
sold it to the appellee; but does this
serve to vest a valid title in Elam?
To hold so would establish a rule
which would disrupt the business
usages and social customs of our
modern life. It can be safely said
that one-fourth of all personal property is not in the hands, and thus under the control, of the owner, but is
entrusted to the care of others. Is
it practical then to establish a pernicious rule that a bailee may trans-

tNOTRE DAME LAW REPORTER
mit a valid title simply because he
has possession? We are aware that
an owner who intrusts property to
another and then so conducts himself
as to lead third persons to believe
that the possessor is also the owner,
may be estopped to deny title in his
bailee. But in this case the appellee
purchased the colt relying solely on
the representations of Smith that he
was the owner. He admits that he
never saw Smith before and that he
did not make any inquiries regarding
Smith's title from any other person.
This is a case where the doctrine of
'caveat emptor' must be applied. The
appellee has not introduced a scintilla of evidence to show that the
appellant ever did anything to estop
him from claiming the colt, nor has
he by any means shown that Perry
Smith had such a right to the colt as
would enable him to transfer a valid

title. The instruction is the only one
which touches on the theory of 'bona
fide' purchaser and it stands unsupported by any other announcing the
doctrine that the possession of a vendor or bailee coupled with his claim
of ownership is sufficient to vest the
legal title in a 'bona fide' vendee.
This is clearly contrary to the views
of the authorities.
Ballard v. Burgess, Supra.
Andrews v. Cox, Supra.
Fawcett v. Osborne, Supra.
The court, therefor, erred in overruling the appellant's motion for a
new trial.
We respectfully submit that for the
errors which we believe we have
pointed out in this brief, that the
judgment in the court below should,
in all things, be reversed.
Respectfully submitted.

BRIEF OF HUMPHREY L. LESLIE IN CASE OF
HUNTER V. ELAM.
In the Supreme Court of Notre Dame
William Hunter, Appellant
VS.
John Elam ,Appellee
Brief for the Appellee.
Appeal from the Notre Dame Circuit Court.
RECORD.
The appellant's counsel's stateinent
of the record is substantially correct.
EVIDENCE.
The evidence as set out by the appellant's counsel is partially correct,
but the important details of the testimony are garbled and in some in-

stances, mis-stated.

We will con-

sider briefly the testimony given by
each of the witnesses.
The record will show that Dr. Hunter did not state on the stand that he
offered forty dollars for the use of
the mare during the period of gestation, but that the agreement was that
Smith was to allow his mare to be
bred to a stallion of Hunter's choosing. He further testified that he was,
under the agreement, obligated to
pay the money regardless of whether
she became with foal or not, and thAt
Smith gave no other consideration
.-,an the mere allowing of his mare
to be bred. The word 'services' was
used to refer only to the mere breeding of the mare. The rest of the
appellant's testimony as set out by
his counsel is substantially correct.
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Smith agreed to train and raise the
colt, should it be foaled, so that it
would be suitable for the Doctor's
use.
The next witness which the appellant discusses is Perry Smith. We
quite agree that his testimony substantiated that of Dr. Hinter, but
that he testified that he sold the services of the mare both we and the
record deny. He stated that he was
to receive forty dollars for allowing
his mare to be bred to a stallion of
the appellant's choosing; that he was
to train and raise the colt should one
result and that he did this. We wish
to call attention to the fact that he
stated that the forty dollars he was
to receive for allowing his mare to
be bred has never been paid nor even
offered to him. His testimony was
that he had always, up to the time of
the sale of the colt to Elam, had open
and notorious possession thereof,
and that he had stated to the appellee
that he was the owner of the animal.
The appellant's statement regarding
further testimony of this witness we
will not discuss.
The statements of the owner of the
stallion are immaterial to the case
and call for no comment.
The testimony of the appellee is,
with the exception of one statement
correctly summarized. Elam did not
testify that he did not investigate the
ownership of the colt before purchasing it. On the contrary he stated that
he took note of the indicia of ownership which Smith possessed and that
he inquired, as any judicioug man
would, if the said Smith was the
owner of the animal, to which he was
told that he was.
The evidence of Mr. O'Sullivan, the
second witness for the defense, is correctly given.

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES.
The appellee contends that, if there
was a sale consumated between Hunter and Smith, it was a sale of something which had neither an actual
nor a potential existence.
A thing having neither an actual
nor a potential existence cannot be
the subject matter of valid sale.
Benjamin on Sales, 78.
2 Kent's Commentaries, 8th Ed.
604, Side page 468.
Bates v. Smith, 47 N. W. 249.
Battle Creek Valley Nat. Bank v
1st Nat. Bank. 56 L. R. A. 124.
Purcell's Administrator v. Mather,
76 Am. Dec. 307.
Low v. Pew, 11 Am. Rep. 357.
Rochester Distilling Co. v. Rasey
37 N. E. 632.
Hutchinson v. Ford, 15 Am. Rep.
711.
"Where a purchaser of goods permits his vendor to remain in possession, a subsequent bona fide purchaser from such vendor, without
any notice of the original sale, being
put in possession, obtains a good
title as against the prior purchaser."
Cullom v. Guillot, 18 La. Annotated
608.
Shaw v. Levy, 17 Serg & R. 99.
"Where a vendor of personal property is allowed by his vendee to remain in the possession of the property and thus to give to the world a
colorable appearance of continued
ownership, the title of asubsequent
bona fide purchaser from such vendor
will be upheld as against the first
vendee." American & English Encyc.
1164.
"Where an owner of property, designedly or by negligence, intrusts
another with the title, or the indicia
of ownership of personal property,
and the other sells the property to a
bona fide purchaser, such purchaser
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will be protected in his title as
against the owner, upon the principle
that where one of two innocent parties must suffer for the wrong of a
third person, the loss should fall upon
the one who by his act, created the
circumstances which permitted the
fraud to be perpetrated."
American & English Encyc. 1165.
Bates v. Smith, 47 N. W. 249.
"Most of the general exceptions to
the general rule that a bona fide purchaser gets no better title than his
vendor arise from the fact that the
real owner has voluntarily clothed
such vendor with apparent ownership or authority to sell."
Williams v. Merle, 25 Am. Dec. 604.
(notes)
Saltus v. Everett, 20 Wendell 278.
"Where an owner has given to another such evidence of the right of
selling his goods, as, according to the
custom of the trade, of the common
understanding of the world, usually
accompanies the right and authority
of disposal, or has given the external
indicia of the right of disposal, a sale
to an innocent purchaser divests the
true owner's title." Willingham's
Sons v. McGuffin, 90 S.E. 356.

of the colt yet to be foaled, but a contract for the services of the mare for
breeding. They base their contention
on an interrogatory submitted by
them to the jury and the answer returned thereto. They would have us
believe that the services t.hus stipulated for were to be for a period of
gestation, and of such a nature that
the result of such period of gestation
would be their property. Their assertion is erroneous. We grant that
the agreement was for the services of
the mare for breeding, but to say that
those services were to continue
through a prolonged period is erroneous. We contend, and the evidence
will bear out our contention, that Dr.
Hunter agreed to pay Smith the sum
of forty dollars for the mere allowing
of his mare to be bred to a stallion of
the appellant's choosing, and for the
training of that foal which should result therefrom in such a manner as
to render it suitable for a doctor's
use. We presume that the intention
of the parties was that after the colt
should be foaled a contract for its
sale might be consummated between
the parties.

Even the appellant does not allege
that Dr. Hunter testified that the serARGUMENT.
vices stipulated for in the agreement
The appellant proposes but two were to be other than for the mere
questions for consideration, namely, breeding. Did Hunter testify that
"Was the contract between Smith and the contract was that the colt, if it
Hunter an agreement for the sale of should result, was to be his? Most
a thing having neither actual nor po- emphatically, he did not! And yet
tential existence?" and "Was the ap- the appellant would have us believe
pellee such a bona fide purchaser as to that a mere contract to allow a mare
give him good title to the animal in to be bred is a contract for services
question, granting that Hunter was which endure for the period of gestathe owner of the colt at the time of tion and is of such a nature as to give
the appellee purchasing the same?" title to the foal of the mare!
The case of McCarthy v. Blevins,
It is contended by the appellant
that the agreement between Smith 26 Am. Dec. 262, is cited by the apand Hunter was not one for the sale pellant to support his contention.
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We do not deny that this case is a
correct application of the law, but
that it is in point on the case in hand
we refuse to grant. McCarthy v.
Blevins is a case where there was an
actual existence of the subject matter, a potential existence, and this
being true, the court correctly decided that the original vendee was
entitled to possession. (Sawyer v.
Garrish, 35 Am. Rep. 323,. citing McCarthy v. Blevins as a case of potential existence.)
It is the belief of the appellee that
if any claim on the ownership of the
animal in question can be set forth by
the appellant, a perusal of the evidence will show that that claim must
be founded on an attempt to sell the
colt not yet foaled or conceived.
Heretofore we have granted, for the
sake of argument, that the contract
between Smith and Dr. Hunter was
one for services, but it is our belief
that the evidence showed rather an
outright sale of the animal. If this is
the case, then, since the appellant
does not dispute the law that a thing
having neither an actual or potential
existence cannot be the subject matter of valid sale, there is no cause for
us to enter into discussion on that
point. The court will note the authorities which have been cited to
sustain this point of law.
We come now to the second question proposed by the appellant: "Was
the appellee such a bona fide purchaser as to give him good title to the
animal in question, granting that
Hunter was the purchaser or owner
of the colt at the time of the appellee
purchasing the same?" This learned
court will decide that he was. From
every angle from which the case may
be viewed instruction number eleven
as tendered bythe trial court must be
held correct. There is only a half-

hearted attempt on the part of the
appellant's to deny the correctness of
the instruction. They would have us
believe that the evidence as disclosed
by the record does not justify it. In
brief we will set out the law on the
various lights in which the case may
be viewed.
Let us believe for the moment that
Dr. Hunter was actually a purchaser
of the colt and that his contract
therefor was valid. Granting this,
he can not now set up his title to the
colt to deprive John Elam of the
same. Where a purchaser of goods
permits his vendor to remain in possession, a subsequent bona fide purchaser from such vendor, without
notice of the original sale, being put
in possession, obtains a good title as
against the prior purchaser.
American & English Encyc. 1164.
Cullom v. Guillot, Supra.
Shaw v. Levy, Supra.
It is admitted by the appellant that
Elam was a bona fide purchaser without notice. He was put in possession
of the colt and still retains possession.
Can his right to continue in the
ownership of the animal be disturbed
under this rule of law and under
these conditions? We think not.
The second angle from which the
bona fide purchaser theory of the
case may be viewed is from the standpoint that Dr. Hunter was the owner
of the animal and allowed the possession and indicia of ownership to
repose in the witness Smith. That
Smith was in open and notorious possession, that he himself stated that
he was the owner, that to all outward
appearances he was in fact the title
holder, was brought out by the evidence. The court knows that in the
purchasing of horses from farmers,
common vendors thereof, possession
and statement as to ownership are all
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that are usually relied upon. The
appellee had no notice of any sort
that would put a reasonably prudent
man on his guard. He had faith, as
customary in the purchasing of
horses from farmers, in the indicia
of ownership held by Smith. He paid
full value for the animal. He is entitled to continue in uninterrupted
ownership thereof. "Where an owner
of property, designedly or by negligence intrusts another with the title,
or indicia of ownership of personal
property, and the other sells the
property to a bona fide purchaser,
such bona fide purchaser will be protected in his title as against the
owner on the principle that where
one of two innocent parties must
suffer for the wrong of a third person, the loss should fall upon the one
who by his act created the circumstances which permitted the fraud to
be perpetrated."
American & English Cyc. 1165.
Bates v. Smith, 47 N. W. 249.

WYilliams V. Merle, 25 Am. Dec.
604. (notes)
Saltus v. Everett, 20 Wendell 278.
Willingham's Sons v. McGuffin, 90
S. E. 356.
Here we may rest our case and feel
assured that we have proven to the
court's satisfaction that the judgment of the lower court was correct,
that instruction number eleven submitted to the juiry was a correct
statement of the law applicable to
our case.
In concluding, the appellee believes
that he is entitled to the judgment on
two distinct theories, first, that whatever contract existed between Hunter
and Smith, the former took no title to
the colt for which replevin is sought;
secondly, that, granting that Dr.
Hunter did have an interest in the
animal at the time of its purchase by
Elam, the latter is entitled to possession and ownership thereof as a
bona fide purchaser for value.
We respectfully submit that the
judgment of the court below should
be, in all things, affirmed.
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NOTRE

DAME CIRCUIT COURT
Record of Cases.
(Lawrence B. Stephan)

CAUSE NO. 1.

CAUSE NO. 2.

William Smith
VS.
Frank Brown

Henry Lang
VS.
Frank Cramer

Arthur B. Hunter,
Thomas V. Truder,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Harry P. Nester,
Lawrence S. Stephan,
Attorneys for Defendant.
Action on a negotiable instrument
given to plaintiff by defendant, which
is due and unpaid. Demand $116.25.
Complaint in one paragraph.
Plaintiff files amended complaint.
Defendant files answer, in one
paragraph, in confession and avoidance, alleging failure of consideration.
Plaintiff files reply in general denial.
Cause submitted to the court, jury
being waived, and trial had.
Harry P. Nester opens argument
for defense and is followed by Arthur B. Hunter for the plaintiff, and
Thomas V. Truder closes for the
plaintiff while Lawrence S. Stephan
concludes the argument for the defense.
Judgment rendered in favor of
plaintiff in the sum of $106.25, principal and interest, together with attorneys' fees of $20.00 and costs,
which judgment is entered without
relief from valuation or appraisement laws.

Richard B. Swift,
Clement B. Mulholland,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Humphrey L. Leslie,
M. Edward Doran,
Attorneys for Defendant.
Plaintiff brings action on an account to which defendant claims as
set-off, compensation for services rendered. Demand $65.00.
Complaint in one paragraph, action
on an open account.
Defendant files answer in three
(1) General Denial;
paragraphs;
(2) Payment; (3) Set-Off.
Plaintiff files reply of general denial, to each of the paragraphs numbered (2) and (3) of the defendant's
answer.
Judgment rendered in favor of
plaintiff and against defendant's
second and third paragraphs of answer.
CAUSE NO. 3.
John Sullivan
VS.
Harry Dorman
Francis J. Murphy,
Francis J. Clohessy,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Edward C. Donnelly,
Delbert D. Smith,
Attorneys for Defendant.
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Action on a promissory note. Demand $500.00.
Complaint on negotiable promissory note in one paragraph, said note
being due and unpaid.
Defendant files answer in two
paragraphs: (1) general denial and
(2) non est factum.
Plaintiff files reply to the second
paragraph of answer, reply being in
general denial.
Cause submitted to the court, jury
being waived, and trial had.
Judgment in favor of plaintiff in
the sum of $50.000 for which judgment is entered without relief from
valuation or appraisement laws.
CAUSE NO. 4.
John Hamilton

(1) general denial; (2) breach of
warranty.
Plaintiff files general demurrer to
count (2) of defendant's plea, which
is overruled, and plaintiff takes exception.
Plaintiff files replication in two
counts: (1) Similiter to paragraph
one of plea and (2) general issue to
second count of plea.
Defendant files similiter.
Cause at issue, jury waived, and
trial had.
Judgment for plaintiff in the sum
of $83.50.
CAUSE NO. 5.
Fred Schultz
VS.
Hale Paul and
William Paul

VS.

Charles Simpson
Sherwood Dixon,
Robert E. McGlynn,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Leo J. Hassenauer,
Clifford P. O'Sullivan,
Attorneys for Defendant.
This is an action on a contract for
the sale of certain hogs valued at
$83.50, which defendant refused to
accept.
Plaintiff files declaration and praecipe.
Defendant files plea to the jurisdiction, alleging improper service.
Plaintiff admits plea.
Defendant waives service and files
plea in abatement, as to defect in the
name of the plaintiff, which is sustained.
Plaintiff files amended declaration.
Defendant files plea in two counts:

Edwin A. Frederickson,
George L. Murphy,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Arthur B. Hunter,
Harry A. Richwine,
Attorneys for Defendants.
Action for damages occasioned by
the removal of a fence on the land of
plaintiff, landlord, erected there by
defendant William Paul, tenant, and
plaintiff was assaulted by Hale Paul
the son of William Paul while in the
act of removing such fence. De.
mand $5000.00.
Complaint in three paragraphs:
(1) theory of master and servant relation between father and son; ()
conspiracy; (3) that father counseled
and directed the son to commit assault and battery.
Defendants file separate and several demurrer.
Demurrer sustained in behalf of
each' defendant to the second and
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third paragraphs of complaint, and
leave taken to amend.
Plaintiff files amended third paragraph of complaint.
Defendants file separate demurrer
to the amended third paragraph
which is overruled and defendants
separately except.
Defendants file answer in three
paragraphs: (1) general denial; (2)
son assault demesie; (3) defence of
property.
Plaintiff files reply to the second
and third paragraphs of answer, the
reply being traverse de injuria.
Jury impanelled, cause submitted,
and trial had.
Plaintiff tenders twelve instructions in writing, seven of which were
indicated as given, and five refused.
Defendant tenders two instructions
in writing, one of which is indicated
as given and one refused. To the
giving and refusal to give these tendered instructions plaintiff and defendant properly except.
Defendants tender 25 interrogatories with request that they and each
of them be submitted to the jury to
be answered and returned with the
general verdict. Then court refuses
to submit interrogatories Nos. 4, 12
22, and 23, to which refusal the defendants separately and severally except.
George L. Murphy opens argument
for plaintiff and is followed by Harry
A. Richwine for the defendants. Arthur B. Hunter concludes the argument for defendants and Edwin A.
Frederickson closes for the plaintiff.
The court now instructs the jury
in writing and files the instructions
numbered from 1 to 19 inclusive and
orders that they become part of the
record without bill of exceptions.
The jury retire and return into

open court their verdict :-"We the
jury, find for the plaintiff as against
the defendant Hale Paul and we assess the damages at $5000. And we
further find for the defendant William Paul as against the plaintiff."
The jury also return the interrogatories with their answers thereto.
Hale Paul files separate motion for
judgment on the answers to the interrogatories non obstante veredicto.
Motion overruled to which defendant
Hale Paul excepts.
Defendant Hale Paul files motion
and twelve causes for a new trial
which is overruled and he excepts.
Plaintiff now files motion and four
causes for the new trial as against
the defendant William Paul which
motion the court overrules and the
plaintiff excepts.
Judgment on the verdict for plaintiff as against defendant Hale Paul,
to which said defendant objects and
excepts, and judgment on the verdict
for defendant William Paul as
against plaintiff to which plaintiff objects and excepts.
Defendant, Hale Paul, prays an appeal to the Supreme Court of Notre
Dame, which is granted and ten days
in which to file general bill of exceptions. Thirty days granted said defendant to file appeal bond in the sum
of $500.00 with Francis T. Walsh and
Jerome Martin as sureties, which
sureties are hereby approved by the
court.
Plaintiff prays an appeal to the
Supreme Court which is granted and
ten days given in which to file general bill of exceptions. Thirty days
granted plaintiff in which to file appeal bond in the sum of $200, which
bond is hereby approved.
NOTE :-The decision of the case
by the Supreme Court of Notre Dame
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is elsewhere reported in this number
Cause at issue, trial by jury.
of the Reporter, as also are the arguBefore argument plaintiff tenders
ments to the jury made by Edwin A. instructions, all of which are refused,
Frederickson for the plaintiff and to which the plaintiff severally exArthur B. Hunter for the defendant. cepts as to each instruction tendered
CAUSE NO. 6.
William Hunter
VS.
John Elam
Michael E. Doran,
Edward McMahon,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Jerome J. Martin,
Humphrey L. Leslie,
Attorneys for Defendant.
This is an action in replevin, to recover a horse alleged to be owned by
the plaintiff, in virtue of a contract
of sale prior to that by which defendant purchased and secured possession
from the the same vendor.
Plaintiff files complaint in one
paragraph in replevin.
Defendant files demurrer to complaint, which is overruled and exception taken.
Defendant files answer in two
paragraphs: (1) general denial and
(2) bona fide purchaser. Demurrer
by plaintiff to the second paragraph is
sustained, to which defendant excepts.
Plaintiff files reply in two paragraphs to paragraph (2) of answer:
(1) general denial; (2) setting up
ownership.
Defendant files motion to strike
out second paragraph of plaintiff's
reply on the ground that it is an argumentative general denial. Motion
sustained; second paragraph of reply
stricken from the record; plaintiff
takes exception to this ruling.

and refused. Defendant tenders instructions all of which are refused
and the defendant excepts 9everally
to each ruling.
Plaintiff submits interrogatories,
as also does the defendant.
Arguments by Ed. McMahon opening for the plaintiff and H. L. Leslie
for the defense, while J. J. Martin
closes for the defense and M. E. Doran for plaintiff.
Court instructs the jury in writing
and orders instructions to be filed and
made part of the record without bill
of exceptions.
Jury retires and returns into open
court this verdict :-"We the jury
find for the defendant and against
the plaintiff."
Answers to the interrogatories
were also returned.
Plaintiff moves for judgment non
obstante veredicto on the answers to
the interrogatories.
Motion overruled to which plaintiff excepts.
Plaintiff files motion and ten
causes for new trial, which motion is
overruled and plaintiff takes exception.
Defendant moves for judgment on
the verdict.
Judgment rendered for defendant
that the plaintiff take nothing by his
action and that defendant recover his
costs, to which judgment plaintiff objects and excepts.
Plaintiff prays an appeal to the
Supreme Court of Notre Dame. Appeal granted and five days given to
file afpeal bond in the sum of $300.00
which bond and sureties on such bond
are hereby approved by the court.
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Plaintiff is granted ten days to file
general bill of exceptions.
NOTE :-The opinion rendered by
the Supreme Court of Notre Dame on
this case is to be found elsewhere in
this Reporter, as also are the briefs
submitted on the case by Messrs.
Michael E. Doran and Humphrey L.
Leslie.
CAUSE NO. 7.
Mary McClelland
VS.
William Meyers
Clement B. Mulholland,
Edwin C. Donnelly,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Richard B. Swift,
Thomas V. Truder,
Attorneys for Defendant.
This is an action for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained
by the plaintiff, due to the careless
and negligent driving of an automobile by the defendant's son. Demand
$1500.00.
Plaintiff files complain in two
paragraphs: (1) on the theory 6f
masfer and servant; (2) on the
theory of negligence of master.
Defendant files motion to make
more specific which is overruled.
Defendant files several demurrer
to complaint alleging (1) failure to
specify the relation between plaintiff
and defendant; (2) that second paragraph does not state specific act or
omission which caused the injury.
Court overrules demurrer to each
paragraph to which ruling on each
paragraph defendant excepts.
Defendant files answer in three
paragraphs (1) general denial; (2)

contributory negligence; (3) alleging ordinary and reasonable care.
Plaintiff makes motion to strike
out paragraphs two and three of answer, which motion is sustained, and
the defendant severally excepts.
Jury impanelled, cause submitted
and tried.
Plaintiff tenders four instructions;
three instructions given and one refused. Defendant tenders three instructions two of which are given and
one given as modified. Defendant excepts to the giving of the plaintiff's
instructions numbered 2, 3 and 4,
and also takes exception to the ruling
on the court in refusing his tendered
instruction No. 1. Plaintiff excepts
to the giving of each of defendant's
instructions.
Plaintiff submits interrogatories
numbered one to seven all of which
are given. Defendant submits interrogatories numbered one to eleven,
the court refusing all but numbers 1
and 11, to which ruling defendant excepts.
.Edwin C. Donnelly opened the ar.
gument for the plaintiff, followed by
Richard B. Swift for the defendant.
Thomas V. Truder closes the argument for the defense and Clement B.
Mulholland concludes the case for the
plaintiff.
The court now instructs the jury
in writing and files the instructions,
ordering that they be made a part of
the record without bill of exceptions.
The jury retire and return into
open court the general verdict in favor of plaintiff, fixing damages at the
sum of $750.00.
The jury also return the interrogatories with their answers thereto.
Defendant files motion for new
trial, which the court overrules, to
which the defendant takes exception.
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Judgment rendered in favor of
plaintiff in the sum of $750.00.
Defendant prays an appeal to the
Supreme Court of Notre Dame which
is granted and five days given in

which to file general bill of exceptions. Thirty days granted said defendant to file appeal bond in the sum
of $1000.00, which bond and sureties
thereon is hereby approved.
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IN THE NOTRE DAME CIRCUIT COURT
HON, F. J. VULPILLAT, JUDGE
Arguments in the Case of
FRED SCHULTZ V. HALE PAUL AND WILLIAM PAUL
by
EDWIN A. FREDRICKSON, ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
and
ARTHUR B HUNTER, ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANTS
FREDRICKSON FOR PLAINTIFF.
Your Honor; Gentlemen of the Jury:
I don't believe that it is necessary
for me to argue for any great length
of time in behalf of the plaintiff in
this case, Mr. Schultz, in view of the
fact that certain matters, certain
facts, have been brought out in the
evidence submitted to you in this
cause, which facts, when the law is
applied to them as per the instructions that will be given you by this
court, leave you with but one course
to pursue in arriving at your verdict:
Gentlemen of the jury, in my mind
you are virtually compelled to find for
Mr. Schultz as against both William
Paul and Hale Paul, awarding Mr.
Schultz the five thousand dollars asked for and not one penny less.
This is an action in damages; an
action brought by Mr. Schultz as result of an assault and battery committed upon him by Hale Paul the
5th day of June, 1919, on a farm some
two and a half miles west of the city
of South Bend. For all the natural
and probable consequences of this assault Mr. Hale Paul, under certain
circumstances, is liable, which circumstances I believe we have conclusively proven; and for all the natural and probable consequences of
this same assault Mr. William Paul.
under certain circumstances, is likewise liable, which circumstances I be-

lieve we have likewise proven. Now
then, gentlemen of the jury, it has
not been necessary in this case for us
to prove the assault itself, for both
Hale Paul and William Paul, while
on the witness stand, admitted the
striking of the blow complained of
What then are the defenses offered
by these defendants in their hope to
escape liability? Well, they are twe
in number. Hale Paul tells you,-first
of all, that he struck Fred Schultz in
self-defense; and, secondly, that he
struck Mr. Schultz in defense -of-his
master's property. Gentlemen of the
jury, I ask you is either of these
defenses sustained by the evidence?
Before you can conscientiously believe that Hale Paul struck Fred
Schultz in self-defense, you must certainly believe that, prior to the assault, Mr. Schultz assumed some sort
of a threatening attitude towards
Hale Paul; in other words, that Hale
Paul had reasonable grounds to fear
bodily injury at the hands of Mr.
Schultz. But what is the evidence o"
this point? First of all, the allegation by the Pauls, on the one side, of
the fact that Mr. Schultz did assum
a threatening attitude, but on the
other side, the absolute denial of that
fact by Mr. Schultz, with his testimony corroborated by the testimony
of Mr. Leslie, an eye witness to the
entire transaction. And this is not
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the only evidence that must be considered by you relative to this point
This court will instruct you that, in
deciding upon any disputed question,
you must not rely alone upon the tes
timony of the various witnesses with
reference to that particular question,
but that you must consider all the
evidence, all the facts and attending
circumstances, as brought out by the
evidence. And now let us review
these other facts. Surely, before you
can believe that Mr. Schultz ever offered to inflict bodily harm upon
Hale Paul, you must believe one of
two things: either that when he went
out to that farm he carried in his
heart the intention of committing an
assault upon Hale Paul, or else that,
after reaching the farm, Mr. Schultz
was so angered or incensed by the
deeds or words of Hale Paul that he
was suddenly rendered willing to do
Hale Paul personal injury. But does
it appear that Fred Schultz sought
out Hale Paul upon arriving at the
farm as he unquestionably would
have done had he intended to assault
him? Most certainly not. He proceeded at once to the fence he had
gone out to remove, paying not attention to Hale Paul, some hundred
feet distant in the corn field. And
now just what took* place there at
that fence? First of all, Hale Paul
came running over yelling out, "Mr.
Schultz, you leave that fence alone,"
to which remark Schultz paid no attention. And then what happened?
A little later Hale cried out, "Damn
you, Schultz, if you don't stop I'll
make you stop," to which remark.
Schultz again paid no attention,
whereupon Hale Paul merely repeated the identical words, "damn you,
Schultz, if you don't stop I'll make
you stop," whereupon, the Pauls

claim, Mr. Schultz then assumed a
threatening attitude. Gentlemen of
the jury, without a doubt Hale Paul
made use here of some very forcible
language, but my theory is, and cer-tainly your conclusion must likewise
be, that if these strong words could
ever have so roused the anger of Fred
Schultz as to incite him to the' commission of an assault upon Hale Paul,
they would most certainly have had
that effect the first time that they
were addressed to him. And yet the
Pauls would have you believe, in spite
of the testimony of Mr. Schultz,
backed up by the testimony of Mr.
Leslie, and in spite of all these inconsistent circumstances, that Mr.
Schultz did assume a threatening attitude.
And here is still another point. Recall, if you will please, the fact as
brought out by the testimony of the
defendants themselves-and I am
very careful to question both Hale
Paul and William Paul on this point
-the fact that Hale Paul picked up
that fence rail some time prior to
the time at which the Pauls claim
that Fred Schultz assumed a threatening attitude. What did Hale Paul
pick up that club for, if not for the
very purpose for which it was used
only a few moments later, namely, of
striking Mr. Schultz upon the head
with it with such force and violence
as to flatten him to the ground senseless? What did Hale Paul pick up
that club for, I ask you, did he want
to pick his teeth with it? Recall too,
if you will, the manner in which William Paul warned his son not to
strike Mr. Schultz, of how upon his
arrival at the fence he cried out.
"You'd better not strike him, Hale."
What if anything do these words indicate, if not, that either the Pauls
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had conspired to assault Mr. Schultz,
or else that Hale is possessed of a
most violent and ungovernable temper? And yet Hale Paul tells you
that he struck in self-defense.
And, gentlemen of the jury, even
if Hale Paul had actually acted in
self-defense, had used force as a
means of self-protection, it could not
be contended by these defendants that
he only used such force as was reasonably or seemingly necessary under
the circumstances. It must be remembered that at all times during the
affair out there on that farm a fivefoot fence was between the two men,
that Hale Paul was in the corn field,
and that Mr. Schultz was in the
clover field, and that a substantial
five-foot barrier intervened between
them. Certainly the position of Hale
Paul was actually and seemingly
much less dangerous than it would
have been had there been no fence
in existence. And it was unquestionably unnecessary for Mr. Hale Paul
to reach over that fence and to deal
Mr. Schultz a blow so vicious that it
leveled him to the ground unconscious. And, gentlemen of the jury,
the law does not countenance the use
of excessive force by one really acting in defense of either person or property, and this court will so instruct
you. I tell you, gentlemen of the
jury, that Hale Paul has failed utterly to prove up in this case, either the
plea of self-defense or defense of his
master's property, such as is recognized by the law.
Now then, relative to the liability
of Mr. William Paul; I don't intend
to spend much time on that phase of
this case. If Hale Paul is liable for
this assault, as undoubtedly he is,
then William Paul is also liable, for
the master is always liable for the

tortious act of his servant committed by such servant while acting
within the scope of his employment
and in furtherance of his master's
business or interests. On the witness stand both Hale Paul and William Paul testified that on the 5th
day of June, 1919, and for some time
previous thereto Hale Paul was and
had been in the employ of his father,
acting as his servant and assisting
him in the operation of his .farm
And both defendants also admitted
that at the very time the blow was
struck Hale Paul was such servant,
acting within the scope of his employment and in furtherance of his master's interests, namely, attempting to
prevent the removal of that division
fence. And so I say, that I don't feel
the necessity of tarrying long upon
the proposition of William Paul's
liability.
And now just a few words with
reference to the damages asked for
and I am through. Gentlemen of the
jury, surely you must realize that
no verdict that you could possibly return could ever right the wrong that
has been comniitted upon Mr.
Schultz; that no verdict that you
could possibly return could ever place
him in the position he was in prior
to the 5th day of June, 1919. And
surely, therefore, you must feel it
your solemn duty to award him such
monetary damages as will compensate him as best they can for the loss
he has sustained. And now what are
the proper elements of his damages?
Are they merely the medical and
nursing expenses he has incurred, the
wages he has already lost, the mental
and pbysical suffering he has endured? Hardly. Dr. Royans has told
you that Mr. Schultz is permanently
injured, that he is suffering from an
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organized thrombus resulting in the
permanent paralysis with which he is
afflicted; and has told you further
that Mr. Schultz will never again be
able to do a day's labor. Oh! I am
not unmindful, gentlemen of the jury,
of what Dr. Allney had to say with
regard to paralysis, bloodclots, etc.,
but I want to tell you that, personally, I haven't very much respect for
the medical opinion of a physician
who would have me believe that human heads don't vary in shape and
size; and who is wont to compare the
human blood stream to the lubricating system of an automobile. Why,
gentlemen, I have just a little too
much regard for the greatest piece
of handiwork of God to believe that
the human blood stream is but a
lubricating system. I wonder what
Dr. Allney thinks its purpose isperhaps a means of oiling the joints.
No I am not fearful of the effect of
Dr. Allney's testimony. And now if
Fred Schultz is permanently paralyzed, as unquestionably he is, and
incapable of ever doing another day's
labor, what additional loss has he
sustained as result of this tortious
assault? Simply the complete loss of
all such earnings as he might have
made in the future; and now when
one stops to consider that, as per the
testimony of Mr. Schultz himself and
of Mr. O'Hara, his employer, Mr.
Schultz had for some time previous
to 5th day of June, 1919, been earning a salary of one hundred and fifty
dollars per month; and that, as per
the testimony of Mr. Doran and as
per the American Table of Mortality.
Mr. Schultz has expectation of life
amounting to some twenty-four
years, one needn't be possessed of exceptional mathematical ability to
figure out that the present value of

such a salary most certainly amount3
to a sum much greater than the five
thousand dollars asked for. But,
gentlemen of the jury, why should
you haggle over the question of damages? Look at Mt. Schultz! What is
he today but a mere miserable shadow of his former self, a misery. to
himself, a misery to his family, a
misery to everyone with whom he
comes in contact; a man not only deprived of the ability of ever doing another day's labor, but a man deprived
of something even more valuable than
that-a man deprived of the satisfac
tion that comes to every man at the
conclusion of an honest day's toil.
and all as the result of the malicious
and tortious assault committed upon
him by Hale Paul? Why, gentlemen
of the jury, can there be any doubt in
your mind of the fact that, if Fred
Schultz were to have his choice, he
would rather have the health and vigor and physical well-being that were
his prior to the 5th day of June 1919.
than to have you award his a hundred
thousand dollars damages! So now
go into the jury room, gentlemen of
the jury, and consider the evidence in
this case, and consider the law, and
then all that I ask of you is that you
of your moral consciences.
act in accordance with the dictations
HUNTER FOR DEFENDANTS
Your. Honor-Gentlemen:
Not only do we believe, as has been
ably pointed out by my co-counsel in
his argument, that the evidence in
this case is clearly in favor of the defendants, separately and jointly, but
we are also convinced that the law is
clearly in our favor on the issues involved.
There are at least four phases of
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the alleged liability of the defendants
in this case on the paragraphs of
plaintiff's complaint. They may be
represented by four questions.
1. Is William Paul liable on the
first paragraph of the complaint?
2. Is William Paul liable on the
amended third paragraph of the complaint?
3. Is Hale Paul liable on the first
paragraph of the complaint?
4. Is Hale Paul liable on the
amended third paragraph of the complaint?
It shall be my purpose to treat
these four questions.
William Paul is not liable on the
plaintiff's allegations in the first paragraph of complaint because: firstly,
the mere relationship of parent t:
child does not make the father liable
for any tort committed by his child;
secondly, the plaintiff has not shown
by a preponderance of the evidence
that the son at the time of the assault
was working as his father's servant;
thirdly, and most important of all,
there was no unlawful assault committed by Hale Paul as alleged in the
first paragraph. If no such assault
was committed, and you have heard
the evidence, gentlemen, clearly showing that it was not, then certainly
William Paul is not liable on any
theory for a tort never committed.
Then, too, William Paul is not liable on the plaintiff's allegations in
the third paragraph of complaint because it nowhere appears in the evidence that William Paul did or said
anything to induce his son to go tc
the place where the plaintiff was, oi
that he aided, abetted, encouraged, or
counselled any retaliation, even for
the assault which the plaintiff committed before he was downed by a
blow from the light stick in the hands

of the boy Hale Paul. Rather it does
appear that he at the time counselle his son and called to him not to striks
the plaintiff, under and provocation
or assault, for the reason that hc
knew the plaintiff's general reputa
tion for turbulence of character in
the community in which the plaintiff
resiles. If William Paul did no:
counsel, aid, or abet his son, even to
defend himself, certainly plaintiff's
failure to prove facts sustaining his
third paragraph of complaint releases
William Paul from all liability thereon. The learned court will instruct
you that every material fact alleged
by the plaintiff must be proved by
him by a preponderance of the evidence.
But let us get down to the two parties most intimately involved in this
case and try to disc6ver what, if any,
liability attaches to the defendant
Hale Paul from the proQf or lack o-'
proof of facts alleged in the plaintiff's
first and amended third paragraphs
of complaint.
The defendant Hale Paul is
charged with the direct commission
of an assault and battery in each of
these paragraphs. The allegations as
to Hale Paul's part in the alleged tort
are practically the same in both cases.
Suffice it to say that either the second
or the third paragraph of answer alleges facts sufficient to free Hale Paul
of any liability for any act of his
directed against the plaintiff on the
fifth of June last.
It is the law and the court will
instruct you that not only must the
plaintiff prove the operative facts of
at least one of his paragraphs of complaint, but he must also meet successfully as to each paragraph the special
items of defense set up by each of
the defendants in their second and
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third paragraphs of answer. The
court will instruct you that if you believe that Hale Paul committed an assault and battery on the plaintiff, in
the defense of his property rights or
in defense of his person, and that ai
the time Hale Paul was himself without fault and in a place where he had
a right to be and that he believed tha"
he would suffer bodily harm at thy
hands of the plaintiff, and, while so
believing, struck the plaintiff, using
no more force than was necessary to
defend himself against the threatened injury he believed was about to be
inflicted upon him, that he struck the
plaintiff in the proper and reasonable
defense of his property rights, that
if you believe either of these states of
facts to have existed, then you must
find for the defendant Hale Paul.
Certainly, gentlemen, both of these
justifications, as has been shown in
the argument of my co-counsel on the
evidence in this case, did exist.
We are not contending that the
mere words of the plaintiff at the time
just preceding and at the time of the
threatened injury to Hale Paul werl
sufficient provocation or excuse to entitle the defendant Hale Paul to
"whale away" and slap the plaintiff
over the left ear, but we do contend
that even such words strengthened
the defendant Hale Paul in his belief,
already existing, that he was in danger of bodily harm, and when coupled
with the fact that the plaintiff adfanced towards him in a menacing attitude and with a spoken threat, that
belief became so acute that Hale Paul
was absolutely certain, as would any
one of you gentlemen have been under like circumstances, that he was
in grave and immediate danger of
bodily harm.
Remember also that Hale Paul was

in a place where he had a right to be;
on a farm leased from the plaintiff
by William Paul for a cash rental and
on a farm in the crops and stock of
which, the plaintiff has shown absolutely no interest; and at a fence on
that farm, which fence was plainly a
temporary fence, which fence, for
some whimsical reason that the plain.
tiff has not seen fit to allege or disclose, the plaintiff wanted to remove
and was arbitrarily removing at the
time of the alleged assault on June 5,
1919, and which fence, moreover, was
placed there without a word of complaint on his part; that, finally, this
fence was at the time the personal
property of the occupants of the farm
at the time and if the plaintiff had
succeeded in accomplishing his evil
purpose of tearing down the whole or
any part thereof, and carrying any
portion of it away, such plaintiff
would have been guilty of larcency.
Therefore, we say that Hale Paul was
free from fault and was in a place
where he had a right to be.
Furthermore, Hale Pacl used the
only reasonable means at hand to defend his person and his property and
certainly used no more force than
was necessary to defend himself
against the threatened injury that he
believed was about to be inflicted upon him. This phase of the case has
been so ably presented by my colleague in his argument that I need
only mention it here.
If the plaintiff really thought that
he was entitled to have this fence removed, why did he not seek an ap.
propriate remedy in equity or seek
his actual damages in law? The
courts have even been open to him
for such purpose. He had no right
to take the law in his own hands and
then be heard to complain if his own
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forceful, unlawful means were met
by other means, perhaps forceful, but
certainly no more so than was actually necessary under the circumstances.
Perhaps he knew himself to be in the
wrong. Perhaps he had consulted an
honest lawyer and that lawyer had
told him that it is the general rule of
law that when a landowner consents
expressly or by implication to the
placing of an addition on his land,
without an express agreement as to
whether it shall become a part of the
realty or remain personalty, an
agreement will be implied that it is
to continue personal property. In
any event he showed by the very violent manner in which he dealt with
the fence that he realized that it was
not a fixture but was severable. He
seemed to forget, however, that the
right to remove this fence or to refrain from removing the same, rested with his tenants who had put up
the fence.
Perhaps you are saying to yourselves, "Oh, well, what have all these
propositions to do with the case?"
Gentlemen, I am merely endeavoring in my humble way to present to
you the case of the defendant William

Paul and the case of the defendant
Hale Paul and convince you, as I have
long ago become convinced, that this
whole suit is the result of malice. You
had the opportunity and duty to
watch and compare the demeanor and
candor of the plaintiff and the defendahts in the court room. You
have had every opportunity to note
the apparent lack of any of those
symptoms or traces of paralysis in
the plaintiff from the moment that he
left the witness stand. You have had
the chance to see before you in his
every littleness this plaintiff who
threatened to "get even" with these
defendants because they saw fit to
resist force with force. Doubtless
you have already formed an opinion
in your own minds which of the witnesses were telling the truth. The
learned court will instruct you that
you may consider the demeanor of
each and every witness on the stand
along with all other facts and circumstances in the case. We believe
that you will view this case as men
and that you will deal justice as men.
We know that any act of either defendant was fully justiled at the time
and we ask of you only simple justice.
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JUNIOR MOOT COURT
CAUSE NO. 1.
John Hamilton
VS.
Charles Simpson
Action for Breach of Contract.
Damages $100.
Charles Simpson, riding in company with a friend, passed the farm
residence of John Hamilton and,
seeing a sow and five sucking pigs on
the Hamilton farm, stopped, examined them, then drove to the barn yard
of Hamilton where he opened negotia.
tions with Hamilton for the purchase
of the pigs. As a result of the talk
it was agreed by-and between them
that Simpson was to buy the sow and
pigs for the stipulated price of $83.50
and Hamilton was to sell and deliver
them to Simpson the next day at his
residence in South Bend, Indiana, and
receive payment.
Next day Hamilton brought the
sow and pigs to the residence of
Simpson in South Bend as agreed,
but Simpson refused to accept or receive them or permit Hamilton to deliver them, giving as his reason that
he feared the pigs might have the
cholera; that he would not consent to
accepting delivery of the sow and pigs
unless Hamilton would submit them
to examination for the purpose of determining whether or not they had
cholera, and for the further reason.,
as Simpson stated, that he did not
think he could be forced to take the
pigs and sow. Who should recover
and why?
George D. O'Brien and,
Donnelly C. Langston,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.

Alden J. Cusick and
Joseph H. Flick,
Attorneys for Defendant.
PLAINTIFF'S POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES.
The fact in this case that the hogs
are not goods, but are chattels will
take the oral contract out of the
operation of the Statute of Frauds.
Burrills Law Dictionary: Goodsstrictly seems applicable only to
inanimate movables, being in this
respect less comprehensive than
CHATTELS, which include animals.
19 Ill. 584; 133 Ind. 472.
The word CHATTELS is of more
than general signification than
GOODS. 56 Mo. 58, 20 Mich. 357.
CHATTELS is more comprehensive than GOODS and includes animate as well as inanimate property.
159 Pa. St. 220.
2. Since the oral contract has been
taken out of the operation of the
Statute of Frauds it is possible to
make a constructive delivery of the
CHATTEL. Since this is the case
title has already passed to the purchaser in this case and the vendor
was in the position of bailee after the
passing of the title.
Where, by .the contract itself, the
seller appropriates to the purchaser
a specific chattel, and the latter thereby agrees to take that chattel and pay
the stipulated price, the parties are
then in the same situation as they
would be after a delivery of the goods
in pursuance of the general contract;
the appropriation is equivalent to a
delivery and the assent of the purchaser to take the specific chattel and
pay the price is equivalent to acceptance. The effect of the contract
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therefore is to vest the property in
the purchaser. 6 W. Va. 255; 17 L.
R. A. (N. S.) 807; 61 S.E. 235 (Rule
Stated) ; Cited in 50 L. R. A. (N. S.)
124.
3. If the purchaser inspects for
himself the specific goods sold and
there is no express warranty, and the
seller is guilty of no fraud, and is not
himself the manufacturer of the
goods sold and there is no eypress
warranty, and the seller is guilty of
no fraud, and is not himself the
manufacturer of the goods sold, the
doctrine of CAVEAT EMPTOR applies even though the seller presumes
the purpose for which the goods were
required. 30 Am. Rep. 639; 64 N.
Y. 411; 22 Fed. Rep. 52.
Where the means of knowledge are
at hand, and equally available to both
parties, and the subject is open to the
inspection of both parties alike, there
is no implied warranty. 33 La. Ann.
1364.
4. There was no implied warranty
that the hogs were sound and the vendee cannot set up the fact that the
vendor warranted the hogs.
DEFENDANT'S POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES.
I The Contract of Sale in this
case is governed by the Statute of
Frauds.
Burns Annotated Statutes of In.
diana 1908 Vol. III, Sec. 7469: "No
contract for the sale of any goods for
the price of $50 or more shall be valid
unless the purchaser shall receive
part of such property or shall give
something in earnest to bind the bar
gain or in part payment or unless
some note or memorandum in writing
of the bargain be made, and signed
by the party to be charged thereby

or by some person thereunto by him
lawfully authorized."
The contract in this case is parol
and for the sale of goods of more
than $50 in value.
Hogs are "goods" within the meaning of the Statute of Frauds I) Vawter v. Griffin et all, 40 Ind. 600"Webster says: 'Goods, n. p.; movables, household furniture, horses;
Raleigh says:
cattle, utensils'.
'Syn.: goods comprehend furniture
or other moveables or movable estates, as cattle, implements, utensils.'
Words & Phrases Vol. IV,
2
Page 3131: "The words 'goods, wares
and merchandise' are equivalent to
the term 'personal property' and arc
intended to include whatever is not
embraced by the words 'lands, tena
ments and hereditaments.'
Cyclopedia of Law & Proce3
dure Vol. XX, Page 1267.
4
Tigany on Sales, Page 72.
No acceptance; no part payment;
no memorandum in writing to the
contract of sale in this case.
1
Mere delivery of goods by the
purchaser is not sufficient; he must
receive and accept the same. In
Frankie v. Trulove, 54 N. E. 461 Ind
Appellate, it is said: "The receipt of
property contemplated by the Statut
which will take the contract of sale
out of the operation of the Statuta
the seller cannot by this act of deinvolves delivery by the seller, but
livery render the contract enforceable against the purchaser without
receiving the goods or some part
thereof by the purchaser as his property under the contract."
2) Dehority v. Paxton, 97 Ind.
253, "The seller must part with his
control for the purpose of vesting the
right of property in the buyer who
must receive with such intent on his
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part." See also Shindler vs. Houston, 1 N. Y. 261; Hooker v. Knab, 26f
Wis. gl; Stone v. Browning, 51 N.
Y. 211; Johnson v. Cuttle, 105 Mass.
447.
II. The Damages sought in this
case are improperly measured and
excessive.
The measure of damages for the
breach of an executory contract of
sale by the purchaser is the differenc.
between the contract price and the
market price of such goods at the
time the contract was broken.
In Singer v. Chaney, 51 S. W. 813,
the Kentucky Court holds: "that
where the buyer of logs had a right
to inspect them and to reject such as
did not meet the requirements of thc
contract that the title did not pas
until the logs were accepted and
therefore the measure of damages
for the buyers refusal to take and
pay for the logs was not the contract
price but the difference between the
price agreed to be paid for the logs at
the time and place of delivery and the
sum for which the seller could, by
reasonable effort, have sold them after the buyer had refused to accept
them." See also: Acme Food Co. v.
Older, 17 L. S. A. (N. E.) 808; Dollman v. Studebaker, 52 Ind. 286.
Judgment for Defendant.
CAUSE NO. 2.
John Kent, by William
Jones, next friend
VS.
The Michigan Central
Railroad Company.
Action for Damages,-$10000.

The defendant, in operating its
road, carries on its trains, to be used
by its servants, certain signal torpedoes, which were apparently harmless, but which in fact were dangerous explosives. That a train of the
defendant, carrying such torpedoes
was stopped by its servants at a
water tank and station in South
Bend; that said servants took some
of the torpedoes and placed them on
the track in an exposed place without
any cause or necessity for doing so,
but merely for the fun of seeing them
explode; that the defendant's train
negligently failed to explode all thesq
torpedoes and left them exposed in a
public place where people generally
were accustomed to pass as well
known to the defendant and without
objection by the defendant, a place
on its right-of-way.
That the plaintiff, John Kent, a boy
of ten years, was standing near the
station with other boys when this
train stopped; that just after the
train moved on, another boy of ten
years who had been walking alon ,
just along behind the train to the
knowledge of the servants of the
train, saw the unexploded torpedo
and picked it up and carried it to
where the plaintiff and other boys
were standing and showed it to them,
not knowing what it was or its dangerous character, some 150 feet from
where he picked it up to where he
carried it. That this boy handed the
torpedo to the plaintiff who also did
not know its dangerous character,
that plaintiff inspected it and while
so doing it exploded and occasioned
considerable damages to the plaintiff
by reason of personal injuries, for
which he now brings this action
through his next friend. Should
plaintiff recover or not and why?
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III. For a definition of Proximate
cause see Intervening or concurrent
causes, 22, R. C. L. 199.
A railroad company is not relieved
from liability to a child injured by-an
improperly fastened turntable, by the
fact that it was put in motion by the
PLAINTIFF'S POINTS AND
playmates of the injured child. 22 R.
AUTHORITIES.
C. L. 167.
I. The case of Harrimann vs.
A person is generally held liable
Ptitsburgh, C. & St. L. R. Co., 12 N.
for any injury resulting for leaving
E. 451, is on all four with the case at
explosives in a place accessible to
bar, the facts are identical with those
children, especially if it is a public
in this case.
place or a place where children are
In that case a child of ten years of
wont to congregate under circumage wa sinjured by reason of the exstances which do not make them wilplosion of a railway torpedo which
ful trespassers.
the servants of the company had
Wells vs. Gallagher, 144 Ala. 363.
placed upon the track at a place near
3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 759.
the station and where the public were
St. Louis R. R. Co. vs. Gaggner, 116
wont to gather, a playmate of the S. W. 948. 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) and
child picked up the torpedo and notes in 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 586.
while handling it, it exploded, injurIV. The act of the child causing
ing the plaintiff. The court held: the explosion is generally held not to
That the railway company was liable be such an intervening cause as will
for the injury caused by the negli- relieve the defendant of liability.
gence of their employees, who placed See 22 L. R. A. 167.
Walter A. Rice and
George 0. Witteried,
Atty's for Plaintiff
Charles P. J. Mooney and
Peter Lish,
Atty's for Defendant

the torpedo upon the track at where
children were wont to play.
This case is the leading case along
this line and the holding of the court
in that case has been sustained in the
78 S. E. 816; 38
following cases:
S. E. 356; 47 Ohio St. 387; 24 N. E.
658-8 L. R. A. 464; 11 R. C. L. 664-20
R. C. L. 87.
II. Attractive Nuisances - The
following case held that anything
in the nature of explosives is
attractive to children and persons
using them must exercise the utmost
care in using and handling them,
especially if they are liable to be
accessible to children. Mattison vs.
Minn. & N. W. R. R. Co., 95 Minn.
477; 104 N. IV. 443; 70 L. R. A. 503,
given in the notes in L. R. A. (N. S.)
19-1128.

DEFENDANT'S POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES.
I. The act of the trainmen in
placing the torpedoes on the track
cannot be deemed the act of their
master, i. e., the railroad company.
See Sullivan vs. L. & N. R. R. Co., 74
S. W. 171; Morier vs. St. Paul Ry.,
17 N. W. 952; Smith vs. N. Y. R. R.
Co., 78 Hun. 524; Young vs. South
Boston Ice Co., 150 Mass. 527; Birnbaum vs. Philadelphia R. R. Co., 94
Atlantic 925; John vs. Birmingham
Realty Co., 55 South 801; Bowley vs.
O'Connell, 27 L. R. A. 173; Snyder
vs. Hannibal, etc., R. R., 60 Mo. 413;
Davis vg. Houghtelin, 14 L. R. A. 737.
II. The act of the child in handing the torpedo t othe plaintiff was
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such an intervening cause as broke
the casual connection between the
alleged negligence of hte trainmen
and the injury to the plaintiff. See
Kinkbeiner vs. Solomon, 24 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 1257.
III. The torpedo is not a dangerous agency. See Mize vs. L. & N. R.
R., 16 L. R. A. 1084; Kleebauer vs.
Western Fuse Co., 60 L. R. A. 377.
The fact that the person responsible for the intervening act is a child
does not affect the case, but, if the
act itself is an intervening effective
cause, it will break the casual connection. See Finebeiner vs. Solomon,
24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1257; Otter vs.
Cohen, 1 N. Y. Supp. 430; Loftus vs.
Dehail, 65 Pac. 379.
The plaintiff is not conclusively
presumed to be incapable of contributory negligence. In fact, there is
no presumption either way regarding
his capacity. See Terre Haute R. R.
Co. vs. Tupperbach, 9 Ind. App. 422,
36 N. E. 915; Riderbaur vs. Kansas
City R. R., 13 S. W. 889; Elwood vs.
Addison, 26 Ind. App. 28, 59 N. E.
47; Citizens Street Ry. vs. Stoddard,
10 Ind. App. 278, 27 N. E. 723.
The defendant is not an insurer of
the safety of children because he is
the owner of appliances that may appeal to their youthful fancies. See
Lewis vs. C. C. C. & St. L. R. R. Co.,
84 N. E. 23; Galveston Ry. vs. Cunie,
10 L. R. A. 307; Ballard vs. L. & N.,
16 L. R. A. 1052; Fitzmaurice vs.
Conn. R. Co., 3 L. R. A. 149; Clark
vs. Richmond, 8 Am. St. Rep. 281;
Daniels vs. N. Y. & N. E. Ry Co., 28
N. E. 283; Frest vs. Eastern R. R., 9
At. 190; Union Stock Yard & Transit Co. vs. Butler, 92 Ill. App.-;
Ryan vs. Tomar, 87 N. W. 644.
Judgment for Plaintiff.

CAUSE NO. 3.
John Jones
VS.
Samuel Smith
Action on Note.

Demand $100.

Samuel Smith, defendant, signed
and delivered his promissory note
payable in Bank for $100 to Richard
Roe. Jones purchased the note from
Roe before its-maturity, paying valuable consideration therefore.
The facts are that Smith did not
think he was signing a note; that he
was merely signing an order for
medicine and treatment; that Roe so
represented and stated to him thai
the paper he, Smith, signed was an
order for medicine; that he could
neither read nor write and so stated
to Roe at the time of the transaction;
that he stated to Roe that he would
sign the paper if it was an order for
medicine; and that Roe thereupon
gave the paper to a stranger who hap.
pened to be present at the time who
read it and stated that it was an order for medicine; that he was thus
misled into signing the paper and except for these facts would never have
signed it; that he intended to. sign
only an order for the medicine he
was purchasing at the time. The defendant's wife and son were within
the building where this transactior
occurred, but were not called and
consulted by the defendant at the
time. Should the plaintiff recover or
not and why?
James L. O'Toole and
Frank M. Franciscovich,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Henry W. Fritz and
Hugh Gibbons,
Attorneys for Defendant.
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PLAINTIFF'S POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES.
1. Where a person is induced by
fraud t, sign a bill or note under the
belief that he is signing a different
instrument, his signature is null and
void and he is not liable there or
even ad against a bonafide purchaser
for value provided that in so doing or
signing he acted without negligence.
However this rule does not apply
because defendant was negligentthe degree of care is clearly stated in
13 N. W. R. 132.
2. When one of two innocent parties must suffer for the fraud of another the loss shall fall upon the one
who enabled the third party to commit the fraud.
This point is brought forward in
29 Iowa 498.
3. The defendant is estopped from
maintaining the defense of fraud
against the Bonafide holder because
of negligence.
This point is illustrated in 77 Cal.
572; 73 Pas. 286. Also 79 Ind. 80, and
29 Ohio 473.
4. The definition of negligence:
(Ruling case Law Vol. 10, page 1)
Negligence is the lack of diligence,
omission of due care, failure to use
the efforts or like precaution which
an ordinary prudent person would
employ in like circumstances.
The degree of diligence required:
13 N. W. R. 892.
5. Fraud in obtaining a note does
not affect a bonafide holder-13 Ala.
106.
DEFENDANT'S POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES.

never a party to such a contract.
Green v. Willie, Z6 L. R. A. 435;
Gibbs vs. Linabury, 22 Mich. 479 Am.
Rep. 675; First Natl. Bank vs. Deal,
55 Mich. 592; Webb vs. Carlin, 78
Ind. 403-51 Mich. 563; 35 Neb. 651;
29 Ohio St. 467-9 Am. Rep. 548.
II. No one can be made a party
to a contract without his own consent. Briggs v. Ewart, 51 Missouri
245 (11 Am. Rep. 445); Martin v.
Smylee, 55 Miss. 577; Corby v. Weddle, 57 Miss. 452.
III. Although a nMaker is not liable
to read or write, yet if he signs a
paper without any attempt to learn
the contents he wil be guilty of negligence which will preclude his defense of fraud. Fisher v. VonBehren, 70 Ind. 19.
IV. Where a party to an instrument undertakes to read it over in
the presence of the other party in
order that the latter may understand
its contents before signing it, the
party reading it is morally bound to
read it correctly, and the other party
has a right to rely upon its being so
read and need not examine it himself. Anderson v. Walke , 34 Mich.
113. See Baldwin v. Bucher, 86 Ind.
221; William et al. v. Stall, 79 Ind.
80; Webb v. 'Corbin, 78 Ind. 403.
St. Joseph Loan & Trust Co.
of South Bend, Indiana
VS.
First National Bank of
Chicago, Illinois.

I. An illiterate maker of a note
and mortgage for $1,000, who is
Action for $1000 Note Collection.
fraudulently induced to sign them
lease
a
signing
he
is
that
supposing
CAUSE NO. 4.
and a note for $100 to a different
even
note
the
on
liable
is
not
payee,
Plaintiff sues to recover the amount
if it is in the hands of an innocent
certain checks which it claimed to
of
purchaser, unless he was guilty of
and which came into the defendown
negligence in making it, since he was
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ant's hands and which it claims to
own, under the following facts:
Plaintiff sent the checks to the
Peoria National Bank of Peoria, Illinois, endorsed as follows: "For collection pay to the order of F. G. Bryan, Cashier," Bryan being the cashier of the Peoria National Bank.
The Peoria Bank then sent the
checks to the defendant. The defend.
ant and the Peoria -Bank at that time
and for a long time prior thereto had
an agreement by which the two
Banks collected all the commercial
paper for one another thus sent tc
them. and instead of remitting the
proceeds of the collections just
credited the amounts of such collections to their accounts between them.
After sending these checks to the
defendant the Peoria Bank became
insolvent, heavily indebted to the defendant. Defendant collected these
checks and gave credit to the Peoria
Bank on its account as usual under
their agreement.
Plaintiff sues defendant to recover
the amount of the checks. Defendof contract between itself and the
ant insists that there is no privity
plaintiff; that plaintiff is a third
party and can have no rights under
the agreement between the Peoria
Bank and itself.
Who should recover and why?
Frank E. Coughlin and
Joseph E. Sanford,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Gerald Craugh and
William S. Allen,
Attorneys for Defendant.

PLAINTIFF'S POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES.
1. A legal title to commercial
paper restrictively endorsed for collection only cannot be acquired from
a bank to which it is sent for collection. Lyons vs. Wisconsin National
Bank, 26 Atl. 520. Title remains in
the endorser. National Butchers and
Drovers Bank vs. Hubbell, 117 N. Y.
384.
2. An endorsement for collection
of negotiable paper by the owner is
notice to every bank and person into
whose custody it may come that the
owner has not parted with his title,
but merely with possession for the
purpose of collection. National Bank
vs. Johnson. 69 N. W. 49.
3. Title remains with the first
owner who restrictively endorses the
paper. 3 Fed. 257; 33 Fed. 408; 26
Atl. 520; 19 Fed. 302; 22 N. E. 1031.

DEFENDANT'S POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES.
Defendant contends that it is not
liable because title to paper passes to
the Peoria Bank when sent to it by
plaintiff and the Peoria Bank must
be looked to for relief. Plumes County
Bank vs. Bank of Rideout S. & Co.,
47 L. R. A. 552; 131 Pac. 360. Also
Davis vs. Elmira Savings Bank, 161
U. S. 275; 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 502.
Judgment for Plaintiff.
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ONLY

OUR

OWN

OPINION

"CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION" IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
WOMAN'S SUFFRAGE AMENDMENT IS CONSTITUTIONAL.

THE DEFENSE OF RASTUS BROWN*
*Written as part of a mock trial for a
negro minstrel, by Francis J. Vurpillat, ex-

me yo' ears; and if yo' have any tears
to shed prepare to shed dem now. I
Judge of the 44th Judicial Circuit of Indiana
and a member of the Law Faculty of the come not to bury pore Rastus but to
University of Notre Dame, Indiana. Pubsave him. Yo' may think because de
lished in Case and Comment, January, 1918,
issue.
testimony shows dat Rastus was
Yo' Hono' and Genmen of dis Jury: caught red'handed-I mean blackDar's pore Rastus Brown in de handed-in de act; dat he was seen
toils of de iaw. And what fo'? Fo' de to emerge from Mister White's chickstealin' of a chicken-fo' de takin' of en coop with de aforesaid chicken una chicken. Now listen to de formal der his arm; dat he was trailed by de
charge:
footprints on de sands of time he
United States of America,
made from dat chicken coop door to
de back door if his chicken; and dat
State of Indiana,
he was caught dere with de aforesaid
County of Nowhere,
chicken in his possession; dat dere
Town of Oblivion.
In de Piece of a Justice Court.
am no possible defense for pore RasJoe Johnson, de town marshal, and tus under de law. But I say to you,
Jim Jackson, de night watch, both be- Genmen of de Jury, dere is a defense
ing duly sworn, on deir oaths say dat fo' him.
I appeal to you upon
in said county, on de moonlight de higher, de supremer, de unwritnight of de 24th day of Decem- ten law of dementia Africana. And
ber, one thousand nine hundred if de learned Piece of a Justice
sixteen, Annie Domino, one Rastus -should say dat such a law cannot be
Brown, early and late of said invoked, I would jus' call yo' attencounty, did den and dere felon- tion to de illustrious example of
iously and unlawfully steal, take, pur- Abraham Lincoln. When Abraham
loin, pilfer, and carry away of de Lincoln was about to issue de famous
personal belongings of Mister Wyan- Emancipation Proclamation freein'
dotte White one chicken, commonly all de Negroes in de land from ordicalled a rooster, but uncommonly call- nary slavery,. de charged him with
ed Chief Cockscomb, of de fictitious breakin' de Constitution he had
value of five hundred dollars, but of sworn to sustain. But he answered
de real value of ten cents a pound, dat he would sustain de Constitution
weighin' 3 pounds, bein' 30 cents,if he had to break it to sustain it. So,
against de peace and dignity of de Gemmen of dis Jury, when yo' are
aforesaid Johnson and Jackson and about to issue your emancipation procontrary to de Justinian and Blacks'- clamation freein' pore Rastus from
tonian codes.
dis criminal servitude and court
Now, Genmen of dis Jury, Ma or anyone else says yo' are doin'
Friends; Negroes, Countrymen, lend violence to de law yo" took oath
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to sustain, tell dem in de language of
Lincoln dat yo' are goin' to sustain
de majesty of de law if yo' have tc
break it to sustain it. Why dere's nc
law in de universe but what's broken
sometime or udder. Even de law of
gravitation and de laws of de planetary system were broken; fo' don't
yo' know de Good Book says dat Joshua commanded de sun and de moon to
stand still and dey did stand still.
Now I.seogoin' to prove to yo' Gemmen of de Jury, dat de nigge' has de
right to take de chicken. De chicken
and de Negro belong togedder. Dey
sustain de most pleasant relations togedder in dis world, and if dere's nc
chickens in de nigge' heaven den I
say to you dere's no heaven fo' de
nigge's. Ever since de days of de
flood when de ark rested on A-rat
and Noah and his sons started de red,
white and blue races, and his son
Ham started de black race-ever
since de days of Ham de egg has gone
with it. And jus' as shuah as de Negro is de descendant of Ham, and de
chicken is descendant of de egg, and
jus' as shuah as ham and eggs go togedder 'mong de white folks so do de
nigge' and de chicken go togedder.
Why, Gemmen of de Jury,

upon which dis intelligent jury will
surely free dis Negro. But dere arc
some particular reasons why dey will
free him. Why, dis love of de chihken was not only born in pore Rastus
but it was bred in him.
He was
taught to take de chicken at his mudder's knee. One time when little Rastus was only seven years old, de c-l o'ed minister came to visit de family
and he gave Rastus a quarter arid
told him to buy himself a chicken. But
jus' as soon as he minister was gone
Rastus' mudder said to him: "Rastus
Yo' dun give dat 25-cent piece to yo'
mudder and yo' go get dat chicken
in de natural way." And I suppose
Rastus obeyed de teachin's of his
good mudder.
And now we have come to de moonlight night of de 24th of day December when dis awful crime was committed. Pore Rastus had prayed dat
de Lord might send him a chicken fo'
de Christmas dinner; and yo' may believe me or not, but I will stake my
professional reputation and personal
reputation on de truthfulness of de
story dat, after pore Rastus prayed
in vain fo' three days and three
nights dat de Lord might send him a
chicken, he was about to despair
"Breathes dere de (Negro), with soul so when a ray of light struck him and
dead
he heard a small voice say to him:
Who never to himself hath said,
This is my own, my native (chicken) ?"
"Rastus, don't yo' know dat de Lord
Freedom to de Negro without de helps dem dat help demselves? Inright to take de chicken would be no stead of sayin' 'Lord send me a chickfreedom at all; for de most natural en, say 'Lord, send me to a chicken.'"
propensity, de strongest proclifity. Rastus did, and soon he was on his
de intensest desire, of de Negro is to way dat fateful moonlight night of
take de chicken. Abraham Lincoln de 24th of December, happy to think
knew dis when he freed de nigge's, dat he would have a chicken dinner
and you know dat freedom was un- and a Merry Christmas fo' his family
limited. So de nigge' has de civil But alas! how different dat pleasant
right as well as de natural right to dream from dis awful reality. Dar's
pore Rastus in de toils of de law,
take de chicken.
Now dese am de general principles chained to de ball, broken-hearted
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and downcast.. And dere by his side
sits his pore widowed wife, cryin' as
if her heart would break. And look
at de three little, innocent pickan.
ninies, watchfully waiting fo' dleir
fadder to be free. 0 how long must
dis injustice last; how long is de
law's delays?
Gemmen of de Jury, have yo' no
hearts? Have yo' no high intelligence
and reason to see dat Rastus had no
criminal intention in dis case, but dat
he was simply moved by dat same dementia dat is de second nature of all
us Negroes? Den have de courage of
yo' convictions and apply de high, su-

preme, unwritten law of dementia
Africana, and free pore Rastus hert.
and now. Every man on dis jury
who says dat Rastus Brown is not
guilty rise in his miyht and say aye.
(A unanimous uprising and chorus
of ayes by the jury. The court directs the signing of the verdict and
tells Rastus he is a free man. Whereupon, Rastus expresses his gratitude
thus: "Well, Gemmen, I's shuah glad
fo' yo' kindness, and I want yo' all
to come to my house some moonlight
night, after prayer meeting, fo' a
chicken dinner.")
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CASE AND

COMMENT

NOTE: A lawyer's license is granted the contributors to this section of the
Reporter. But case comment and criticism is here made upon the sole responsibility
of the contributors.

(By JOHN P. TIERNAN)

In a Vermont case, Ex-Parte St.
Augl, 108, Atl., 203, the Vermont
court held that in habeas corpus to
recover custody of infants, damages
for their detention are not recoverable since habeas corpus is a proceeding to determine solely the status of
the parties affected and not to provide a compensatory remedy to person deprived of their custory. Obviously the proper remedy for such
relief would be an action for loss ol
services.

In a Michigan case, Krolilcos Kazmarek, 175, N. W., 239, the court
held that where a sale is made in violation of the Bulk Sales Statute
and is successfully set aside by creditors of the seller, the buyer can recover the price paid in an action
against the seller, since there is a
failure of consideration and the seller cannot plead his own violation of
the statute as a defense. With the
greatest. deference, it is submitted
that this decision is unsound. There
is no failure of consideration since
title and possession passed to the
buyer and the sale was absoluttely
valid between the original parties as
the cburt itself expressly states. Further, the buyer is making his own
violation of the statute the basis of
his cause of action and the position of
a defendant is the more advantageous
where both parties are equally at
fault. The statute imposes the duty
of observing its mandates not upon
one but upon both of the parties and
hence where a statute is violated by
the plaintiff he does enter with the
metaphorical "unclean hands" and
should be denied relief from a situation he himself helped to create.

In an Indiana case, Christlieb vs.
Christlieb, 125 N. E. 486, the court
held that on the particular facts alleged, the marriage could be annulled
for fraud. This is the first Indiana
decision that determines the sufficiency of fraud that would justify a dissolution of the marital status, holding that it must be such that "affects
the essentials and fundamentals" of
that relation.

In a South Carolina case, Wilson
vs Palmetto Nat. Bank, 101 S. E. 841,
the court held that a bank is liable for
temperate damages-for failure to honor a depositor's check. There was no
loss shown upon the trial but a shbstantial award of damages was rethrned by the jury. Where no loss
is shown, the verdict should be limit
ed to nominal damages. The court
was certainly conscious of the distinc-

In a Maine case, Stenert & Sons, vs.
Reed, 108 Ati. 334, the court held tha,,
where, in a note given for a piano, title was reserved in the seller until
note was fully paid, recovery of a
judgnent -thereon did not pass title
in piano to buyer in the absence of
satisfaction. The decision is absolutely sound in principle afid in accord with the intention of the parties.
Clearly it is not a case where the doctrine of election of remedies applies.
since action on the note is a personal
remedy, whereas replevin is proprietary.
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tion between nominal and substantial damages but in its desire to allow the verdict to stand and at the
same time do no violenre to the prinsiple itself held that "temperate dam.
ages" are proper in such a case.
The Georgia case, Weayherbt vs.
Pittman, 101 S. E., 131, presents several interesting questions. In this
case the court held that a note given
to attorneys to defend a person charged with crime was based on a sufficient consideration, although the attorneys had previously been assigned
by the court to perform this duty.
The court further decided that oral
ratification of an unauthorized signature to a note was valid. It is to be
observed with respect to the first
point decided, that there was no.
statute compelling attorneys to defend a person charged with crime,
but the judge referred to it as being
a legal obligation arising out of his
relation to the court and originating
in the common law. Here is dictum,
if not decision, that an attorney is
under a legal obligation when assigned by the trial court, to defend a person in a criminal prosecution. But
he is entitled to no compensation for
his services unless a statute expressly provides therefor. There was no
such statute in the state. Hence, the
court reasoned when such services
which the attorneys were legally
bound to render, were rendered, it
created a moral obligation on part of
defendants to pay therefor. This,
the court held, was sufficient to validate the note in view of the fact that
there is in force a Georgia statute,
Civ. Code, 1910, See 4243, expressly
provides that ',a good consideration
is such as is founded on a strong moral obligation.

7. In Myers vs. Fortunate, 108, At.,

678, the Delaware court holds invalid
a city ordinance which provided that
no permit shall be granted by the inspector of buildings for the erection
of a public garage in the residential
section without consent of property
owners. The court draws a distinction between an ordinance that confers arbitrary power upon a public
official and an ordinance giving such
absolute power to a portion of the
people, observing, that "it cannot be
assumed that the official will act arbitrarily or otherwise than in the exercise of a sound discretion." The
court is evidently unmindful that all
the decisions hold invalid an ordinance giving an official arbitrary power in this class of cases. The distinction made by the court, however,
was not necessary to the decision in
the case and the majority of cases
hold that an ordinance of the variety
under consideration is entirely valid.
There is a strong judicial tendency tc
sustain ordinances if it is possible to
do so in order to give effective opera
tion to the municipal police power
that modern conditions demand.
8. In State ex rel. Schafer vs.
Spokane, 186 Pac., 64, the Washing
ton court held valid an ordinance prohibiting operation of jitney busses on
the public streets without a permit
from the City Council. Here is an
important decision on a timely question. It holds that a city can not only
regulate the industry but prohibit it
absolutely within its municipal limits.
The court makes a sound distinction
between cases in which an ordinance
can merely regulate and cases where
its police power can be exercised prohibitively. Speaking with reference
to the facts in the case the court said:
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"But the use to which the appellant
purposes putting hte streets is not
their ordinary or customary use,but a
special one. He purposes using them
for the transportation of passengers
for hire, a use for which they are not
primarily constructed. As to such
users, we think the power of the
municipality is plenary. It devises
reform of regulation pertaining to
business of this character, even to the
prohibition of the business entirely.
9. The Supreme Court of Louisiana in Brown vs. Giullot, 83 So.,
373, rendered an interesting decision.
The case was an application for a
writ of mandamus by the defendant
in a criminal prosecution to recognize the right of one Mundy to represent the relator as his counsel in the
trial court. Court issued the writ,
holding that the right of a person to
practise law can not be questioned
collaterally. The principle involved
here is of course not decisive of a
case where the court inquires intc
the authority of a person to represent
a party as his attorney, this being
merely a question of agency, and
presupposing the legal right of the
person to practise law generally. The
unauthorized act. of an attorney in
representing a client, however gives
the court no jurisdiction of the
party's person although a few courts
hold it to be a mere irregularity.

10. The Texas case of Richmond
vs. Sangster, 217, S. W., 723, strikes a
fatal blow at transient divorces. It
presents a flagrant case of perjury
and imposition upon the Illinois
courts by a party who deserted the
domicilary state and located tempor.
arily in Illinois in order to obtain the
decree. The decree was held void fo"
lack of jurisdiction therefore, not
only in Illinois but in Texas. It
merited no exterritorial recognition
in other states on the principle of
comity and could demand no operation by virtue of the full faith and
credit clause of the Constitution,
citing Haddock vs. Haddock, 26 S.
W. Rep. 525, and a host of decisions
from leading states of the Union,
This instructive case, sound in its
reasoning, just in its decision -and
commendable in its doctrine, brings
once more to the forefront the subject of foreign divorces. As to how
a divorce granted in one state can be
rendered conclusive, valid not only
as to the merits of the case, but jurisdictionally in other states, is a legal
question that is believed to be incapable of solution. But apart from this
rigid adherence to principle as is
clearly evidenced by the courts in an
inexorable demand that jurisdiction
is indispensable to the validity of the
judgment, the courts render society
itself a noble and a lasting service in
discouraging the divorces that are
scandalizing American life.
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DAME'S LEGAL
NAISSANCE

RE-

Hoynes-these are the founders,
names to be forever honored at Notre
Dame, men who, under unauspiciou(By Delmar J. Edmundson)
conditions, steered the unwieldy bark
It's an ill wind, as the philosophers to recognition and honor. Though
say so aptly and frequently, that the visible manifestations of their
blows nobody good. Several years work passed with the old law room
ago, when an intermittent fire gnaw- their memory remains dear to thous
ed persistently at the old Chemistry ands of alumni in the legal profesHall till nothing but the walls re- sion.
mained, it. would have taken a keen
Erected on the site of the first
and optimistic eye to discern a silver Chemistry Hall, the new building
lining in that catastrophe. But what wherein was established the Hoynes
at first blush seemed a tomb stone College of Law, stands as a symbol
happily proved, a stepping stone to of the new regime. Improvements
better things. A new Chemistry are manifold; facilities for assimilatHall, proof against flame, was erected jurisprudence notably increased-a
back of the charred shell of the old, change which works to the consternaand lo! from that shell emerged the tion of the "snap course" man, who
new improved Law College.
no longer finds a law degree the easIn the embryo days of that depart- iest, but rather one of the hardest to
rent the learned but handicapped acquire.
The law library constantly grows
professors held forth always within
the cramped space of one room; legal in size and catholicity. The law facmaxims, thundered into attentive ulty is to be increased to a number
ears, echoed from one wall to anoth- more readily able to handle the overer, walls that must have grown weary flow of incipient barristers. The law
of the rule in Shelley's Case. Those building contains a fully equipped
long, sturdy benches, through gener- cout room, behind whose bench a
ation after generation of law stu- Marshall might be honored to sit.
dents were victims of the sculptural Courses in procedural law and court
aspirations of men who had little tal- schedule have been inadgurated by
ent but much energy and sharp the new dean, Judge Vurpillat, which
knives. Thus if they found Blacc- are unique and exceptional in the law
stone not to their taste, circumstances schools of the country. These and
were not lacking to encourage ani countless other changes, of which it
would be useless to attempt an enumemulation of Praxiteles.
That same room knew many able eration, have been made. The scribe
men, professors who strongly build- may recount the various forward
ed the foundations, and students who steps that have been taben, but it
reared the structure to do Alma Ma- were almost impossible to describe
ter proud in forensic circles. Under the new spirit that pervades the dethe circumstances the wonder is that partment, a spirit of proud contentso much was accomplished. Timothy ment and achievement that is, it may
E. Howard, Lucius Hubbard, Colonel be said, an inevitable accompaniment
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of the advance in legal paraphernalia
and environment. But these changes
are not the only ones to be recorded,
Those in the personnel of the faculty
are of as great an importance.
Judge Francis J. Vurpillat, proclaimed Dean of the College of Law
at the beginning of the school year,
is a man whose wide experience and
scholarly mind eminently fit him for
the position. During his long and
brilliant career he served in various
official capacities, notably as prosecuting attorney of the 44th Judicial
Circuit of Indiana for three consecutive terms, and for several years as
County Attorney and as City Attorney at Winamac, his native city. In
November, 1908, he was elected
Judge of the 44th Judicial Circuit
and served in that incumbency for
six years. In addition to the fame
attained in virtue of the fact that he
was the youngest circuit judge ever
elected in Indiana, Judge Vurpillat
gained prominence and favorable
comment from the bench and the bar
on account of written opinions delivered in cases of unusual importance tried by him, among which were
the Kankakee Meander Land case;
another case involving the construction and constitutionality of the Fee
and Salary Law; and another placing the first construction on the general liquor laws of the state, particu.
larly the local option law and the
Proctor Regulation Act, a construction affirmed by the State Supreme
Court. Judge Vurpillat was called

to the Law College in 1015 by the
Rev. John Cavanaugh, the then presi.
dent, and since that time has devoted
his talents and energies exclusively
to the work of acting dean. The
leadership of Judge Vurpillat augurs
well for the Law College, and much
may be expected from his administra.
tion.
Colonel William. Hoynes is honored
as Dean Emeritus of the Law College
For his past services none can fail to
pay him admiring reverence; the
University is rich indeed in the benison of his genial personality and profound erudition. Next year Colonel
Hoynes will give active service as a
special lecturer in Legal Ethics and
International Law, of which he is a
recognized authority.
Assistant Professor James P. Costello, who recently joined the law
faculty, received his degree from the
Dickinson School of Law in 1898, after fifteen years experience as a
teacher in the public schools of Pennsylvania. During the past twentytwo years he has been in active practice at Hazelton, Pennsylvania.
The Law College will continue to
boast the invaluable services of Professor John Tiernan, whose astounding display of mnemonics in citing
cases is at once the marvel and the
despair of students, and of Judge G.
A. Farabaugh, who, besides lecturing
at Notre Dame, continues to serve as
one of the most prominent attorneys
before the bar of South Bend.
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STUDENT ACTIVITIES.
ALDEN J. CUSICK.

THE NOTRE DAME LAW CLUB.
On Monday evening, February 2nd,
in conformity with plans which had
been brewing for several years back,
all the Lawyers of the University met
in a rousing mass meeting and per.
fected an organization to be known as
the Notre Dame Law Club. A constitution previously drafted was read
and adopted. The following officers
were elected for the year: Alden J
Cusick, President; Harry E. Denny,
Vice-President; Francis T. Walsh,
Secretary; Clifford E. O'Sulliv.,,
Treasurer; and Hugh E. Gibbons,
Sergeant-at-Arms.
The purpose of the organization,
quoting from the Constitution, is:
"The general diffusion of legal knowledge among the students of the Law
School by stimulating study of the
law in its broader aspect; and the
promotion of a fraternal spirit among
its members by providing a medium
for social -activity." All who are acouainted with the facts will readily
s~e that the perfection of the Notre
Dame Law Club supplies a long felt
and earnest need of the College of
Law which, in point of enrollment
and instruction is now acknowledged
to rank with the best in the States.
The time has forever passed when
the college-bred lawyer of the progressive type can be a mere compendium of legal doctrines and theories
which were stored in his brain by the
stern tactics of the class room. It is
the human heart-to-heart touch of
fraternity which really puts the aspirant for an LL. B. sheepskin in a
receptive mood and heightens his ambition to know the law. Through the
agency of their Club the law students

seek to get in touch with the more
practical side of the law, and to that
end to hear frequently from men who
are now fighting the legal battles of
their communities and are therefore
in a position to give to the N. D. Lawyers a few of the gems of their experience.
On February 20th the "Club" listened to a very interesting and instructive talk by Mr. Win. MclInerny
of South Bend, an old Notre Dam
law graduate and contemporary practitioner. Mr. McInerny dwelt or
Public Utility Law and it is the unanimous opinion of all who heard him
that his speech was "great." During
the remainder of the term the Law
Club will hear from other well known.
attorneys. And among those who
have already accepted invitations to
speak are Mr. Farabough of South
Bend, one of Indiana's real lawyers,
and Mr. P. H. Martin of Green Bay,
Wisconsin, a criminal lawyer of wide
repute.
The Law Club supplies another
great need of the College lawyer,
the opportunity for fraternizing.
Through the instrumentality of
smokers, banquets and other social
functions the magic warmth of fraternity will be infused into every
man. The Notre Dame Lawyer of
the future need never be forced to an
embarrassing admission that he is not
acquainted with his classmates or
junior associates in the course. And
what's more he can boast of a friendship of brother students from nearly
every state in the Union, for enrollment records show that twenty-eight
states are now represented in the College of Law and reports emanating
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from the office of Dean Francis J.
Vurpillat give good basis for the prophecy that the time is not far distant when each of the forty-eight
states will have one or more representatives. The value of so-called
"mixing" between men from every
section of the country; between men
all working toward a common goal
cannot be overestimated, and particularly so when applied to the law
school and the legal profession. In
the social activities of the Club two
smokers have already, gone into history. A big all-lawyers banquet is
booked for an early date. A committee, under chairmanship of Leo Hassenaeur, reports that indications
point to one of the most elaborate and
enjoyable social events of the year
when the Notre Dame Law Club
gathers 'round the festive board.
Several Chicago lawyers of prominence have been invited to speak on
this occasion.
Let no man accuse the Notre Dame
Lawyers of being dead or inert. They
pull together with a spirit which it
would do others well to imitate. The
snappy co-operation and good fellowship in evidence at every meeting is
a worthy inspiration. They are as
one in active interest and support of
the two-fold aim of their organization: to get in touch with the practical side of the law; and through social activity, to fuse the hearts of all
the law men into a common bond of
friendship. Look for inspiration on
the Notre Dame Law Club. It will
surprise you.
SENIOR LAW CLASS.

and elected the following officers to
represent them for the year: President, Edw. Doran of South Bend,
Ind.; Vice-President, Clifford O'Sullivan of Chicago, Ill.; Secretary, I.
L. Leslie of Waverly, Ia.; Treasurer,
Maurice Smith of Manketo, Ill.; and
Sergeant-at-Arms, George L. Murphy
of St. Cloud, Minn. On but a few occasions indeed, has the Law School
had cause to boast of a graduating
class with the "snap" and talent of
that which leaves the halls of the
Gold and Blue this coming June. Its
members have been prominent in
every activity of the campus and have
made a record which should be a fitting goal for subsequent "grads" to
attain.
On two occasions during the
present school year have the members of the class drunk the rich wine
of good-fellowship over the banquet
board, first in November and again
just prior to the Christmas vacation.
On each occasion the walls of Kable's
parlors echoed with the convivial
laughter of a class which, though
scattered in fact will ever be united
in fond recollection of the few sweet
and profitable years at Notre Dame
in companionship of the "boys" of
'20. The above banquets were enjoy.
ed by senior lawyers exclusively. But
on Sunday, Feb. 15th, they also participated with the seniors of the other
courses in a big all-senior feast in
the Rotary Room of the Oliver Hotel.
And not the least of the many neverto-be-forgotten high spots of thio
event was the masterly oration of
President Doran on "Sunshine vs
Moonshine."

The Senior Law Class of '20 has
On October 15th the last three year
law class to leave the portals of the four representatives on the all-senior
Notre Dame Law School organized Ball Committee. They are Clifford
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O'Sullivan, chairman; Delbert Smith,
Clement Mulholland and Norman
Barry. This committee has full

charge of the Senior Ball which is
the biggest social event on the University calendar.
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ALUMNI

DEPARTMENT

SALUTATION.
This time, just a few words from
an old alumnus of the Law School of
Notre Dame, who is now a member
of the faculty, will grace the Contributing Section of the Department
of the Reporter devoted to the
Alumni. These words are briefly in
salutation to the dear old boys of the
olden days of the old school. Every
one of you may feel assured that you
are remembered, thought of and
loved by the good institution that
continues to move majestically in and
out on the tide of time, year after
year.
We sincerely wish we might present to every one of you, by mail, a
copy of this, the first number of the
It
Notre Dame Law Reporter.
know,
we
would do your heart good,
to receive it. You would be elated at
the opportunity which is afforded the
Alumnus to reach out and grasp the
extended hand of the student of the
Law School of today, in a pledge of
mutual helpfulness made possible by
the legal voyages of the Reporter,
just now so auspiciously launched upon its career.
The "Foreword" prints the complete prospectus of the publication.
If offers the two departments,-thai
of the students and that of the
alumni. Every law alumnus will
profit by the work of the student
body and the faculty of the old school
registered in the Reporter every
quarter; and the students, in return
will greatly appreciate the good will
support and contributed articles,
papers, briefs, and practical talks of

the Notre Dame lawyers who are now
in the real trenches of legal warfare.
No appeal is made for an endowment, now so common among the
great institutions of the country.and
so loyally and generously responded
to by the proud alumni of the respective institutions. But a simple plea
is made to every law alumnus to become one link in the chain of hearts
that bind about the old Law School
of Notre Dame, that they may, with
one mighty beat, put the school to the
fore in standard and reputation, and
thereby make it possible for the
school in turn to put them all more
prominently to the front as boasted
men of the Law School of N. D. .U.
Dear, old Boy: be a subscriber, be
a contributor, be a consistent reader,
be a reporter, be a booster, be a real,
live, loving alumnus of the good, old
school. Send us the news pertaining
to the professional, political and personal activities of yourself and any
other alumnus, for the News Section
Send us your correct professional address, individual or firm name, for
the Legal Directory. And send us
now and then a treatise on the law,
legal brief, case comment or humorous what-not that may be appreciated by us all, students and alumni.
Let us hear from you in comment,
favorable or unfavorable, about the
first issue of The Notre Dame Law
Reporter.
Good-bye and good luck,
"Dear Old Pal of Mine."
FRANCIS J. VURPILLAT,
Class '91.

